Malicious code in proxyrobika (PyPI)
The advisory, in context
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (5242a5c1d50ffd677c3b9b57e28a86baeb0179c10feef81380ef656eecf44206)
The package exposes a single public function starts() that walks /storage/emulated/0/ (the Android primary user-storage root used by Pydroid/Termux-like Python environments), collects every .json, .py, .pyrubi, and .txt file into ZIP archives, and uploads each archive via requests.post to https://tapi.bale.ai/bot<TOKEN>/sendDocument with a hardcoded chat_id of 5263487757. The Bale Messenger bot token is hardcoded in source (with an environment-variable fallback referencing the same literal). The destination, bot token, and chat_id are all author-controlled and not caller-configurable; the README is empty and the code uses single-letter identifiers to obscure behavior. Calling the only documented API therefore ships the caller's local source files, configuration, and Rubika scripts to a mailbox controlled by the package author.
Source: kam193 (ca9520dcc3936b679b577bee42392ecb6ee65cd658c4858d325de5c738a7a200)
The package contains code for automated files exfiltration.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-10-proxyrubika
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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files-exfiltration
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target:android
Affected packages
Start with the recorded fix for your release branch. Check your installed version and test compatibility before upgrading. Fixing this advisory does not rule out other vulnerabilities in the release.
1 explicitly affected versions
0.1.0
View affected-version evidence
{
"ranges": [],
"versions": [
"0.1.0"
]
}