{"id":"MAL-2026-17889","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in proxyrobika (PyPI)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (5242a5c1d50ffd677c3b9b57e28a86baeb0179c10feef81380ef656eecf44206)\nThe package exposes a single public function `starts()` that walks `/storage/emulated/0/` (the Android primary user-storage root used by Pydroid/Termux-like Python environments), collects every `.json`, `.py`, `.pyrubi`, and `.txt` file into ZIP archives, and uploads each archive via `requests.post` to `https://tapi.bale.ai/bot<TOKEN>/sendDocument` with a hardcoded chat_id of `5263487757`. The Bale Messenger bot token is hardcoded in source (with an environment-variable fallback referencing the same literal). The destination, bot token, and chat_id are all author-controlled and not caller-configurable; the README is empty and the code uses single-letter identifiers to obscure behavior. Calling the only documented API therefore ships the caller's local source files, configuration, and Rubika scripts to a mailbox controlled by the package author.\n\n## Source: kam193 (ca9520dcc3936b679b577bee42392ecb6ee65cd658c4858d325de5c738a7a200)\nThe package contains code for automated files exfiltration.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: 2026-10-proxyrubika\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - files-exfiltration\n\n\n - target:android\n","severity":"unknown","score":null,"published":"2026-10-15T20:33:51.000Z","modified":"2026-10-26T19:00:41.077Z","withdrawn":false,"knownExploited":false,"affected":[{"ecosystem":"PyPI","name":"proxyrobika","ranges":[],"versions":["0.1.0"],"fixed":[]}],"references":["https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/proxyrobika","https://pypi.org/project/proxyrobika/0.1.0/"],"sources":[{"name":"OSV","id":"MAL-2026-17889","modified":"2026-10-26T19:00:41.077286378Z","url":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17889"}],"assessments":[]}