{"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2","cveMetadata":{"cveId":"CVE-2026-99454","assignerOrgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","state":"PUBLISHED","assignerShortName":"Linux","dateReserved":"2026-09-25T10:25:14.416Z","datePublished":"2026-11-19T14:41:54.397Z","dateUpdated":"2026-11-22T11:08:21.360Z"},"containers":{"cna":{"providerMetadata":{"orgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","shortName":"Linux","dateUpdated":"2026-11-22T11:08:21.360Z"},"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nstaging: rtl8723bs: fix protected RX frame validation in decrypt path\n\nThe RX software decrypt path mishandles crafted protected frames from a\nmalicious AP in two ways:\n\n1) decryptor() never checks that a protected frame is long enough to\nhold the 802.11 header plus the per-cipher trailer.  All of\nrtw_wep_decrypt(), rtw_tkip_decrypt() and rtw_aes_decrypt() compute\n\n\tlength = hdr.len - hdrlen - iv_len;\n\nand act on the result, and recvframe_chkmic() similarly computes\n\n\tdatalen = hdr.len - hdrlen - iv_len - icv_len - 8;\n\nfor TKIP (the 8-byte Michael MIC is not accounted for in icv_len).\nA frame shorter than hdrlen + iv_len + icv_len (+ 8 for TKIP) underflows\nthese unsigned subtractions, turning into a ~4 GiB iteration count in\naes_decipher()/arc4_crypt()/rtw_seccalctkipmic() or a ~4 GiB crc32_le()\nlength, causing out-of-bounds reads/writes of up to ~4 GiB starting from\nthe rx skb.  Reject such frames in decryptor() before touching the IV;\nthis covers all three ciphers and the TKIP MIC check, and also keeps the\nunconditional iv[3] access within the frame.\n\n2) validate_80211w_mgmt() keeps using the frame - two memcpys through\nthe stale rx_data pointer and a pkt_len update - before checking\nwhether decryptor() returned NULL.  On decrypt failure (e.g. a unicast\nprotected deauth/disassoc/action frame with a bad MIC, which this path\nalways software-decrypts) the skb has already been freed, so this is a\nuse-after-free read/write, and the caller's error path frees the frame\na second time, drifting free_recvframe_cnt.  Bail out immediately when\ndecryptor() fails, freeing the temporary mgmt_DATA buffer first.\n\nDiscovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":8.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH"},"scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"AV:A - A protected 802.11 deauth, disassoc, or action MPDU is pulled from the SDIO FIFO by sd_int_dpc()/sd_recv_rxfifo(), parsed in rtl8723bs_recv_tasklet(), and reaches the patched validate_80211w_mgmt() and decryptor() through rtw_recv_entry() and validate_recv_frame(). Those bytes are a WiFi frame, so the vector is Adjacent.\nAC:L - After rtw_cfg80211_set_encryption() stores the IGTK and sets binstallBIPkey, a WIFI_STATION_STATE and _FW_LINKED station hits validate_80211w_mgmt(), which forces bdecrypted=0 and encrypt=_AES_ and calls decryptor(). One unicast protected frame whose MIC fails in rtw_aes_decrypt() makes decryptor() free the skb before the memcpy. The AP produces that link, then sends the frame; no race is required.\nPR:N - sd_int_dpc() through decryptor() never calls capable() and does not check a host credential. rtw_aes_decrypt() returns _FAIL on a bad CCMP MIC or an addr2 with no sta_info, so the peer needs neither the PTK nor a local account.\nUI:N - rtl8723bs_recv_tasklet() calls validate_80211w_mgmt() straight from the SDIO RX request. A station already linked with an IGTK consumes the forged protected management frame with no ioctl, mount, or confirmation.\nS:U - The skb that decryptor() frees and validate_80211w_mgmt() then copies, and the recv_frame that recv_func_prehandle() frees a second time, are host-kernel objects in the same security authority. This does not cross a guest or IOMMU boundary.\nC:H - When rtw_aes_decrypt() fails, decryptor() dev_kfree_skb_any()s the RX skb and validate_80211w_mgmt() still memcpy()s data_len bytes from the stale rx_data, where data_len is pkt_len minus the 24-byte header, 8-byte CCMP header and 8-byte MIC. The action-frame length sets that span, so the read is freed heap.\nI:H - That memcpy writes the span back to ptr+hdrlen in the freed skb, and recv_func_prehandle() rtw_free_recvframe()s the recv_frame decryptor() already returned to free_recv_queue. A short protected data frame software-decrypted from recv_func_posthandle() (bdecrypted==0) also underflows hdr.len-hdrlen-iv_len into a ~4GiB write in aes_decipher() or arc4_crypt().\nA:H - The stale memcpy in validate_80211w_mgmt() runs in rtl8723bs_recv_tasklet() after dev_kfree_skb_any(), which oopses if the freed skb head is poisoned or reclaimed, and the second rtw_free_recvframe() increments free_recvframe_cnt and desynchronizes the RX frame pool."}]}],"affected":[{"product":"Linux","vendor":"Linux","defaultStatus":"unaffected","repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","programFiles":["drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_recv.c"],"versions":[{"version":"554c0a3abf216c991c5ebddcdb2c08689ecd290b","lessThan":"60e3352593f224306dfab578bf586b301642265f","status":"affected","versionType":"git"},{"version":"554c0a3abf216c991c5ebddcdb2c08689ecd290b","lessThan":"33e8f5740319996788395d85a4c100f61593cb75","status":"affected","versionType":"git"},{"version":"554c0a3abf216c991c5ebddcdb2c08689ecd290b","lessThan":"b0e79d0ed03ee2e2b9bc0b637fcb87567ff46112","status":"affected","versionType":"git"},{"version":"554c0a3abf216c991c5ebddcdb2c08689ecd290b","lessThan":"495cb31c791bdf3f9efef255a9587b05b0526c9d","status":"affected","versionType":"git"}]},{"product":"Linux","vendor":"Linux","defaultStatus":"affected","repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","programFiles":["drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_recv.c"],"versions":[{"version":"4.12","status":"affected"},{"version":"0","lessThan":"4.12","status":"unaffected","versionType":"semver"},{"version":"6.12.117","lessThanOrEqual":"6.12.*","status":"unaffected","versionType":"semver"},{"version":"6.18.63","lessThanOrEqual":"6.18.*","status":"unaffected","versionType":"semver"},{"version":"7.3.2","lessThanOrEqual":"7.3.*","status":"unaffected","versionType":"semver"},{"version":"7.4-rc1","lessThanOrEqual":"*","status":"unaffected","versionType":"original_commit_for_fix"}]}],"cpeApplicability":[{"nodes":[{"operator":"OR","negate":false,"cpeMatch":[{"vulnerable":true,"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionStartIncluding":"4.12","versionEndExcluding":"6.12.117"},{"vulnerable":true,"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionStartIncluding":"4.12","versionEndExcluding":"6.18.63"},{"vulnerable":true,"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionStartIncluding":"4.12","versionEndExcluding":"7.3.2"},{"vulnerable":true,"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionStartIncluding":"4.12","versionEndExcluding":"7.4-rc1"}]}]}],"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/60e3352593f224306dfab578bf586b301642265f"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/33e8f5740319996788395d85a4c100f61593cb75"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b0e79d0ed03ee2e2b9bc0b637fcb87567ff46112"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/495cb31c791bdf3f9efef255a9587b05b0526c9d"}],"title":"staging: rtl8723bs: fix protected RX frame validation in decrypt path","x_generator":{"engine":"bippy-1.2.0"}}}}