{"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2","cveMetadata":{"cveId":"CVE-2026-57114","assignerOrgId":"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa","state":"PUBLISHED","assignerShortName":"GitHub_M","dateReserved":"2026-06-24T00:33:17.706Z","datePublished":"2026-10-23T12:04:29.966Z","dateUpdated":"2026-10-29T13:09:28.257Z"},"containers":{"cna":{"title":"PraisonAI: Jobs webhook SSRF protection bypass via DNS rebinding","problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-367","lang":"en","description":"CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition","type":"CWE"}]},{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-918","lang":"en","description":"CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)","type":"CWE"}]}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"attackComplexity":"LOW","attackVector":"NETWORK","availabilityImpact":"NONE","baseScore":7.2,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","confidentialityImpact":"LOW","integrityImpact":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"NONE","scope":"CHANGED","userInteraction":"NONE","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"name":"https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-rjvw-7vvw-549v","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM"],"url":"https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-rjvw-7vvw-549v"}],"affected":[{"vendor":"MervinPraison","product":"PraisonAI","versions":[{"version":">= 4.5.126, < 4.6.59","status":"affected"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"orgId":"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa","shortName":"GitHub_M","dateUpdated":"2026-10-23T12:04:29.966Z"},"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.126 to before version 4.6.59, PraisonAI's Async Jobs API validates webhook_url when a job request is parsed and again when the internal Job object is constructed. That validation blocks direct loopback/private targets, but it is not bound to the later network request. When a job completes, _send_webhook() passes the original hostname to httpx.AsyncClient.post() with no send-time validation, IP pinning, or guarded transport. An attacker-controlled hostname can therefore resolve to a public IP during Pydantic validation and later resolve to loopback/private/cloud-metadata infrastructure during webhook delivery. This bypasses the intended SSRF guard in current supported releases. This appears to be an incomplete fix / patch bypass for GHSA-8frj-8q3m-xhgm. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.59."}],"source":{"advisory":"GHSA-rjvw-7vvw-549v","discovery":"UNKNOWN"}},"adp":[{"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-rjvw-7vvw-549v","tags":["exploit"]}],"metrics":[{"other":{"type":"ssvc","content":{"timestamp":"2026-10-29T13:09:05.011091Z","id":"CVE-2026-57114","options":[{"Exploitation":"poc"},{"Automatable":"yes"},{"Technical Impact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}}],"title":"CISA ADP Vulnrichment","providerMetadata":{"orgId":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","shortName":"CISA-ADP","dateUpdated":"2026-10-29T13:09:28.257Z"}}]}}