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GHSA-vff3-pqq8-4cpqmedium6.3

Craft Commerce: Potential IDOR in Commerce carts

Impact

An Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability exists in Craft Commerce’s cart functionality that allows users to hijack any shopping cart by knowing or guessing its 32-character number. This vulnerability enables the takeover of shopping sessions and potential exposure of PII.

Source excerpt · OSV

Affected packages

Start with the recorded fix for your release branch. Check your installed version and test compatibility before upgrading. Fixing this advisory does not rule out other vulnerabilities in the release.

Affected rangeRecorded fix
From 5.0.0 before 5.6.0Ecosystem versions5.6.0
From 4.0.0 before 4.11.0Ecosystem versions4.11.0

Version evidence: OSV · GHSA-vff3-pqq8-4cpq

View original version evidence (159 explicit versions)

Original source description

An Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability exists in Craft Commerce’s cart functionality that allows users to hijack any shopping cart by knowing or guessing its 32-character number. This vulnerability enables the takeover of shopping sessions and potential exposure of PII.

Vulnerability Details

Root Cause

The CartController accepts a user-supplied number parameter to load and modify shopping carts. No ownership validation is performed - the code only checks if the order exists and is incomplete, not whether the requester has authorization to access it.

// CartController.php:374-389 - actionLoadCart()
public function actionLoadCart(): ?Response
{
    $number = $this->request->getParam('number');

    if ($number === null) {
        return $this->asFailure(Craft::t('commerce', 'A cart number must be specified.'));
    }

    // No ownership check - returns any cart to any requester
    $cart = Order::find()->number($number)->isCompleted(false)->one();

    // Cart is loaded into attacker's session without authorization
    ...
}
// CartController.php:606-616 - _getCart()
$orderNumber = $this->request->getBodyParam('number');
if ($orderNumber) {
    // Same issue - no ownership validation
    $cart = Order::find()->number($orderNumber)->isCompleted(false)->one();
    // Returns cart to any requester who knows the number
}

Attack Scenario

Prerequisites

  • Target Craft Commerce installation with active shopping carts
  • Knowledge of a victim’s cart number (32-character hex string)

Cart Number Acquisition Vectors

  1. Referrer Header Leakage: Cart URLs shared externally expose the number
  2. Browser History: Accessible on shared/compromised devices
  3. Proxy/WAF Logs: Cart numbers logged in URL parameters
  4. Social Engineering: Support tickets, screenshots containing cart URLs
  5. Brute Force: While impractical for random targeting, feasible for targeted attacks against recently-created carts

References