Kimai has Missing Object-Level Authorization in the Team API
Impact
The Team API endpoints use [IsGranted('edit_team')] instead of [IsGranted('edit', 'team')], causing Symfony TeamVoter to abstain from voting. This removes entity-level ownership checks on team operations, allowing any user with the edit_team permission to modify any team, not just teams they are authorized to manage.
Source excerpt · OSVAffected packages
Start with the recorded fix for your release branch. Check your installed version and test compatibility before upgrading. Fixing this advisory does not rule out other vulnerabilities in the release.
| Affected range | Recorded fix |
|---|---|
| Earlier releases before 2.54.0Ecosystem versions | 2.54.0 |
Version evidence: OSV · GHSA-jv9x-w4gm-hwcm
View original version evidence (199 explicit versions)
Original source description
Summary
The Team API endpoints use #[IsGranted('edit_team')] instead of #[IsGranted('edit', 'team')], causing Symfony TeamVoter to abstain from voting. This removes entity-level ownership checks on team operations, allowing any user with the edit_team permission to modify any team, not just teams they are authorized to manage.
Details
All 8 team association endpoints in src/API/TeamController.php (lines 177, 201, 229, 252, 275, 298, 321, 339) use #[IsGranted('edit_team')] with a single argument. The web controller at src/Controller/TeamController.php:118 correctly uses #[IsGranted('edit', 'team')] with two arguments, passing the $team parameter as the subject. When edit_team is passed as the attribute, TeamVoter::supportsAttribute() returns false because it only recognizes view, edit, and delete. The voter abstains entirely. Only RolePermissionVoter fires, which checks the role-level permission without any entity-level ownership validation.
PoC
Authenticate as a user with edit_team permission who is NOT a member of Team 1
curl -X POST https://TARGET/api/teams/1/members/2 \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <API_TOKEN>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json"
Expected: 403 Forbidden (user is not ROLE_ADMIN/ROLE_SUPER_ADMIN, or member of Team 1)
Actual (pre-2.54.0): 200 OK, user added to Team 1
Impact
In default configuration, only ROLE_ADMIN and ROLE_SUPER_ADMIN have edit_team, and both roles already have irrevocable view_all_data access, making the missing check redundant. The vulnerability becomes exploitable if an administrator grants edit_team to a lower-privilege role (such as ROLE_TEAMLEAD) through the permissions UI. In that scenario, the lower-privilege user could modify any team's membership, customer assignments, project assignments, and activity assignments without being a member or teamlead of that team.