Grav has Insecure Deserialization in File Cache
Impact
- Severity: High - CWE: CWE-502 - Location: system/src/Grav/Framework/Cache/Adapter/FileCache.php - Sink: unserialize($value, ['allowed_classes' => true])
Source excerpt · OSVAffected packages
Start with the recorded fix for your release branch. Check your installed version and test compatibility before upgrading. Fixing this advisory does not rule out other vulnerabilities in the release.
| Affected range | Recorded fix |
|---|---|
| Earlier releases before 2.0.0-beta.2Ecosystem versions | 2.0.0-beta.2 |
Version evidence: OSV · GHSA-gwfr-jfjf-92vv
View original version evidence (321 explicit versions)
Original source description
Insecure Deserialization in File Cache
- Severity: High
- CWE: CWE-502
- Location:
system/src/Grav/Framework/Cache/Adapter/FileCache.php - Sink:
unserialize($value, ['allowed_classes' => true])
Affected version(s)
- Affected:
>= 1.7.44and<= 1.7.49.5(verified in current codebase and changelog-covered releases). - Fixed: No upstream fix identified in the reviewed branch at the time of analysis.
- Notes: Earlier
1.7.xreleases may also be affected, but were not fully back-traced in this review.
Notes
allowed_classes => true allows object instantiation and does not constrain classes.
PoC (Primitive Demonstration)
Preconditions
- Local PHP runtime.
- Goal is to validate the deserialization primitive used in cache retrieval.
Steps
php -r '
class CacheWakeup { public function __wakeup(){ file_put_contents("/tmp/grav_filecache_poc.txt", "wakeup"); } }
$payload = serialize(new CacheWakeup());
unserialize($payload, ["allowed_classes" => true]);
echo file_exists("/tmp/grav_filecache_poc.txt") ? "FILECACHE_UNSERIALIZE_TRIGGERED\n" : "FILECACHE_UNSERIALIZE_NOT_TRIGGERED\n";
'
Expected Result
- Output contains:
FILECACHE_UNSERIALIZE_TRIGGERED.
Interpretation
This reproduces the same unsafe primitive used by FileCache::doGet():
unserialize($value, ['allowed_classes' => true]).
If cache files are attacker-tampered, object magic methods may execute.
Exploit Preconditions
- Cache file poisoning/tampering capability.
Recommendation
- Avoid object deserialization in cache payloads.
- Use non-object formats and integrity protection for cache files.
Maintainer note — fix applied (2026-04-24)
Fixed in Grav core on the 2.0 branch: commit c66dfeb5f — will ship in 2.0.0-beta.2.
What changed: Framework\Cache\Adapter\FileCache now HMAC-signs every cache payload with Security::getNonceKey() on write, and verifies the HMAC on read. Tampered, forged, or pre-upgrade files are treated as cache misses and unlinked instead of being unserialized. The on-disk format is now versioned:
v2
<expires>
<key>
<hmac-hex>
<serialized>
Existing caches rebuild transparently on first read. Note that Framework\Cache\Adapter\FileCache isn't wired into Grav's main cache path — Symfony's FilesystemAdapter is — but the class is reachable by plugin and downstream consumers, so the hardening applies defensively.
Files:
system/src/Grav/Framework/Cache/Adapter/FileCache.php.tests/unit/Grav/Common/Security/FileCacheSecurityTest.php— round-trip, tampered-payload rejection, wrong-key forgery rejection, pre-v2 file rebuild, key-field mismatch.
References
- Security advisory github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-gwfr-jfjf-92vv
- Security advisory nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-7317
- Patch github.com/getgrav/grav/commit/5a12f9be8314682c8713e569e330f11805d0a663
- Patch github.com/getgrav/grav/commit/c66dfeb5f
- Source reference github.com/devsamuelsantiago/grav-cms-filecache-object-injection
- Source reference github.com/getgrav/grav
- Source reference vuldb.com/submit/798732
- Security advisory vuldb.com/vuln/359965
- Security advisory vuldb.com/vuln/359965/cti