WWBN AVideo's GIF poster fetch bypasses traversal scrubbing and exposes local files through public media URLs
Impact
objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php allowed an authenticated uploader to fetch attacker-controlled same-origin /videos/... URLs, bypass traversal scrubbing, and expose server-local files through the GIF poster storage path.
Source excerpt · OSVAffected packages
Start with the recorded fix for your release branch. Check your installed version and test compatibility before upgrading. Fixing this advisory does not rule out other vulnerabilities in the release.
| Affected range | Recorded fix |
|---|---|
| Earlier releases through 26.0 (inclusive)Ecosystem versions | Not recorded |
Version evidence: OSV · GHSA-f4f9-627c-jh33
View original version evidence (0 explicit versions)
Original source description
Summary
objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php allowed an authenticated uploader to fetch attacker-controlled same-origin /videos/... URLs, bypass traversal scrubbing, and expose server-local files through the GIF poster storage path.
The vulnerable GIF branch could be abused to read local files such as /etc/passwd or application source files and republish those bytes through a normal public GIF media URL.
Details
The vulnerable chain was:
objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.phpaccepted attacker-controlleddownloadURL_gifimage- traversal scrubbing used
str_replace('../', '', ...), which was bypassable with overlapping input such as....// - same-origin
/videos/...URLs were accepted url_get_contents()andtry_get_contents_from_local()resolved the request into a local filesystem read- the fetched bytes were written into the GIF destination
- invalid GIF cleanup used the wrong variable, so the non-image payload remained on disk
This made the GIF poster path a local file disclosure primitive with public retrieval.
Proof of concept
- Log in as an uploader and create an owned video row through the normal encoder flow.
- Send:
POST /objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php
downloadURL_gifimage=https://localhost/videos/....//....//....//....//....//....//etc/passwd
- Query:
GET /objects/videos.json.php?showAll=1
- Recover the generated GIF URL from
videosURL.gif.url. - Download that GIF URL.
- Observe that the body matches the target local file, such as
/etc/passwd, byte-for-byte.
Impact
An authenticated uploader can read server-local files and republish them through a public GIF media URL by supplying a crafted same-origin /videos/... path to downloadURL_gifimage. Because traversal scrubbing was bypassable and the fetched bytes were written to the GIF destination without effective invalid-image cleanup, successful exploitation allows disclosure of files such as /etc/passwd, readable application source code, or deployment-specific configuration accessible to the application.
Recommended fix
- Reject any remote image URL whose decoded path contains traversal markers
- Do not allow attacker-controlled same-origin
/videos/...fetches to resolve into local file reads - Constrain any local shortcut path handling with
realpath()and strict base-directory allowlists - Validate GIF content before saving it into public media storage
- Ensure invalid-image cleanup checks the correct destination path