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GHSA-c8h8-vq34-9fw2medium5.4

WWBN AVideo: Stored XSS via unescaped Gallery category description

Impact

AVideo stores category descriptions from user input and later renders category_description as raw HTML in the Gallery view. A user who can create or edit categories can store JavaScript in a category description, which executes when another user views the affected Gallery/category page.

Source excerpt · OSV

Affected packages

Start with the recorded fix for your release branch. Check your installed version and test compatibility before upgrading. Fixing this advisory does not rule out other vulnerabilities in the release.

WWBN/AVideo Packagist
Affected rangeRecorded fix
Earlier releases through 29.0 (inclusive)Ecosystem versionsNot recorded

Version evidence: OSV · GHSA-c8h8-vq34-9fw2

View original version evidence (0 explicit versions)

Original source description

Summary

AVideo stores category descriptions from user input and later renders category_description as raw HTML in the Gallery view. A user who can create or edit categories can store JavaScript in a category description, which executes when another user views the affected Gallery/category page.

This is a stored XSS in the category description field, separate from previously fixed XSS issues in video titles or comments.

Details

Source:

objects/categoryAddNew.json.php

$objCat->setDescription($_POST['description']);

Storage setter:

objects/category.php

public function setDescription($description)
{
    $this->description = $description;
}

Sink:

plugin/Gallery/view/mainAreaCategory.php

  <div id="categoryDescription<?php echo $duid; ?>" style="display: none;"><?php echo $videos[0]['category_description']; ?></div>

The value is rendered without htmlspecialchars(), htmlentities(), HTMLPurifier, or equivalent output encoding.

PoC

Prerequisites:

  • AVideo current master / v29.0
  • User account with permission to create or edit categories
  • Gallery plugin/view enabled
  • At least one video assigned to the affected category

Steps:

  1. Log in as a user who can create or edit categories.
  2. Create or edit a category.
  3. Set the category description to:
  <img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>
  1. Save the category.
  2. Assign at least one video to that category.
  3. Open the Gallery/category page that renders the category section.
  4. The payload is inserted into the page as raw HTML and JavaScript executes.

Impact

An attacker with category edit permission can execute JavaScript in the browser of users or administrators who view the affected Gallery/category page. This can be used to perform actions as the victim, steal same-origin data accessible to JavaScript, or abuse administrative UI actions if an administrator views the malicious category.

Recommended fix

  • Sanitize category descriptions on input with the same HTML policy used for video descriptions, or store plain text only.
  • Encode on output:
echo htmlspecialchars($videos[0]['category_description'], ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8');
  • If limited HTML is intended, run the description through HTMLPurifier before storage or before render.
  • Add regression tests for category description rendering in Gallery views.

References