Symfony's Mailtrap Mailer Webhook Parser Never Verifies the X-Mt-Signature HMAC — Unauthenticated Webhook Event Injection
Impact
The Mailtrap mailer bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks Mailtrap POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its doParse(Request $request, [\SensitiveParameter] string $secret) method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the X-Mt-Signature HMAC header Mailtrap sends with each request.
Source excerpt · OSVMailtrapRequestParser::doParse() now requires and verifies the X-Mt-Signature header, an HMAC-SHA256 of the raw request body keyed with the configured secret, before decoding the payload, using a constant-time comparison.
Affected packages
Start with the recorded fix for your release branch. Check your installed version and test compatibility before upgrading. Fixing this advisory does not rule out other vulnerabilities in the release.
| Affected range | Recorded fix |
|---|---|
| From 7.2.0 before 7.4.12Ecosystem versions | 7.4.12 |
| From 8.0.0 before 8.0.12Ecosystem versions | 8.0.12 |
Version evidence: OSV · GHSA-59f3-vp2f-mp9w
View original version evidence (8 explicit versions)
| Affected range | Recorded fix |
|---|---|
| From 7.2.0 before 7.4.12Ecosystem versions | 7.4.12 |
| From 8.0.0 before 8.0.12Ecosystem versions | 8.0.12 |
Version evidence: OSV · GHSA-59f3-vp2f-mp9w
View original version evidence (54 explicit versions)
Original source description
Description
The Mailtrap mailer bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks Mailtrap POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its doParse(Request $request, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $secret) method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the X-Mt-Signature HMAC header Mailtrap sends with each request.
As a result, an application that wires up the Mailtrap webhook endpoint accepts any POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake delivery / bounce / open / click / spam events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.
Resolution
MailtrapRequestParser::doParse() now requires and verifies the X-Mt-Signature header, an HMAC-SHA256 of the raw request body keyed with the configured secret, before decoding the payload, using a constant-time comparison.
When no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: signature verification remains opt-in, but it is now actually enforced once opted in.
The patch for this issue is available here for branch 7.4.
Credits
Symfony would like to thank Himanshu Anand for reporting the issue and Alexandre Daubois providing the fix.
References
- Security advisory github.com/symfony/symfony/security/advisories/GHSA-59f3-vp2f-mp9w
- Patch github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/4e0467e4e182cf2e704a3d9e1bc1a6be65d52ab8
- Security advisory github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/symfony/mailtrap-mailer/CVE-2026-45755.yaml
- Security advisory github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/symfony/symfony/CVE-2026-45755.yaml
- Source reference github.com/symfony/symfony
- Security advisory symfony.com/cve-2026-45755