Craft CMS: Authorization bypass in `entries/move-to-section` via missing target-section save check
Impact
The EntriesController::actionMoveToSection() endpoint checks only whether the current user can view the destination section, but it does not require permission to save entries into that section. A low-privileged authenticated control-panel user who can move an entry out of its current section can therefore move that entry into a different section where they have read access but no write access.
Source excerpt · OSVThe EntriesController::actionMoveToSection() endpoint checks only whether the current user can view the destination section, but it does not require permission to save entries into that section. Missing authorization check: destination section requires only viewEntries, not saveEntries.
Affected packages
Start with the recorded fix for your release branch. Check your installed version and test compatibility before upgrading. Fixing this advisory does not rule out other vulnerabilities in the release.
| Affected range | Recorded fix |
|---|---|
| From 5.0.0-RC1 before 5.9.21Ecosystem versions | 5.9.21 |
Version evidence: OSV · GHSA-43cq-c2gq-pfpw
View original version evidence (168 explicit versions)
Original source description
Summary
The EntriesController::actionMoveToSection() endpoint checks only whether the current user can view the destination section, but it does not require permission to save entries into that section. A low-privileged authenticated control-panel user who can move an entry out of its current section can therefore move that entry into a different section where they have read access but no write access.
Details
The vulnerable route is implemented in EntriesController.php:465:
The destination check is only viewEntries:$section->uid . The source-entry gate is Entry::canMove(), which verifies whether the user can move the existing entry based on the source section:
This closes the exploit chain:
- External source: authenticated CP request to
entries/move-to-section. - Missing authorization check: destination section requires only
viewEntries, notsaveEntries. - Privileged sink:
moveEntryToSection()rewritessectionIdand saves the entry into the unauthorized section.
Preconditions derived from the code:
- The attacker is authenticated to the control panel.
- Entry
345is movable by the attacker from its current section. - The attacker can satisfy
viewEntrieson destination section12. - The attacker does not have
saveEntries:DESTINATION_UID, which is the missing check that makes the bypass possible.
Result:
- The controller accepts the request because
viewEntries:$section->uidpasses. - Each source entry passes
canMove()based on source-section permissions. moveEntryToSection()updates the entry’ssectionIdand saves it.- The entry is now located in a section where the attacker did not have write permission.
Impact
This breaks the intended section-level authorization model. A user with limited content permissions can inject or relocate content into a protected section, interfering with editorial boundaries, approval workflows, section-specific business logic, and content ownership expectations.