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GHSA-3mjv-375j-6h92medium4.9

AVideo: Authenticated Arbitrary File Read in view/update.php

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The advisory, in context

Summary

view/update.php reads $_POST['updateFile'] as a relative path under updatedb/ and passes it to PHP's file() for line-by-line execution as part of a database migration. An authenticated administrator can abuse this to read arbitrary text files reachable from the web-server process — especially valuable on misconfigured deployments where /etc/passwd, .env, or other sibling-app configs are reachable relative to the AVideo directory.

Details

view/update.php, lines 134-145 (excerpt):

if (!empty($_POST['updateFile'])) { $dir = Video::getStoragePath() . "cache"; rrmdir($dir); /* …unrelated cache-clear… */

if (file_exists($logfile . "log")) {
    unlink($logfile . "log");
    // ...
}
$lines = file("{$global['systemRootPath']}updatedb/{$_POST['updateFile']}");

The User::isAdmin() and adminSecurityCheck(true) guards at lines 12-15 enforce admin auth, but $_POST['updateFile'] is concatenated into a path without any sanitization. file() returns the file's contents as an array of lines; the script subsequently iterates them and echoes the SQL it would run.

PoC

POST /view/update.php Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

updateFile=../../../../etc/passwd Result: the script attempts to load /etc/passwd (relative to {systemRootPath}updatedb/), echoing each line in the migration-runner HTML output. $_POST['updateFile'] traversal accepted, no extension guard, no in-array whitelist.

Attempting ../../../../proc/self/environ similarly reveals web-server environment variables on Linux.

Impact

Verified on the current master branch of WWBN/AVideo (commit bc0340662…). Likely affected: every release where view/update.php contains the $_POST['updateFile'] consumer — pattern predates 2024.

Affected packages

Start with the recorded fix for your release branch. Check your installed version and test compatibility before upgrading. Fixing this advisory does not rule out other vulnerabilities in the release.

WWBN/AVideo Packagist
Ecosystem versions

Earlier releases through 29.0 (inclusive)

No fix recorded for this interval.

View affected-version evidence
{
  "ranges": [
    {
      "events": [
        {
          "introduced": "0"
        },
        {
          "last_affected": "29.0"
        }
      ],
      "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
    }
  ],
  "versions": []
}

References