Mautic Vulnerable to User Enumeration via Response Timing

Impact

The attacker can validate if a user exists by checking the time login returns. This timing difference can be used to enumerate valid usernames, after which an attacker could attempt brute force attacks.

Patches

This vulnerability has been patched, implementing a timing-safe form login authenticator that ensures consistent response times regardless of whether a user exists or not.

Technical Details

The vulnerability was caused by different response times when:

• A valid username was provided (password hashing occurred)
• An invalid username was provided (no password hashing occurred)

The fix introduces a TimingSafeFormLoginAuthenticator that performs a dummy password hash verification even for non-existent users, ensuring consistent timing.

Workarounds

No workarounds are available. Users should upgrade to the patched version.

References

• https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/03-Identity_Management_Testing/04-Testing_for_Account_Enumeration_and_Guessable_User_Account
• https://github.com/mautic/mautic-security/pull/146