AVideo has Plaintext Video Password Storage
Impact
AVideo allows content owners to password-protect individual videos. The video password is stored in the database in plaintext — no hashing, salting, or encryption is applied. If an attacker gains read access to the database (via SQL injection, a database backup, or misconfigured access controls), they obtain all video passwords in cleartext.
Source excerpt · OSVAffected packages
Start with the recorded fix for your release branch. Check your installed version and test compatibility before upgrading. Fixing this advisory does not rule out other vulnerabilities in the release.
| Affected range | Recorded fix |
|---|---|
| Earlier releases through 26.0 (inclusive)Ecosystem versions | Not recorded |
Version evidence: OSV · GHSA-363v-5rh8-23wg
View original version evidence (17 explicit versions)
Original source description
Summary
AVideo allows content owners to password-protect individual videos. The video password is stored in the database in plaintext — no hashing, salting, or encryption is applied. If an attacker gains read access to the database (via SQL injection, a database backup, or misconfigured access controls), they obtain all video passwords in cleartext.
Details
File: objects/video.php
Vulnerable setter:
public function setVideo_password($video_password)
{
AVideoPlugin::onVideoSetVideo_password($this->id, $this->video_password, $video_password);
$this->video_password = trim($video_password);
}
Vulnerable getter:
public function getVideo_password()
{
if (empty($this->video_password)) {
return '';
}
return trim($this->video_password);
}
The value assigned to $this->video_password is only trim()-ed before being persisted to the database column video_password in the videos table. There is no call to any hashing function (e.g., password_hash(), sha256, or similar).
When a visitor enters a password to access a protected video, the comparison is done directly against the stored plaintext:
// Comparison at access check:
if ($video->getVideo_password() === $_POST['password']) { ... }
This means:
- Any database read (SQL injection, backup leak, hosting panel access) exposes all video passwords as cleartext.
- Video passwords are often reused by users across other services, making this a credential harvesting risk.
- The plaintext value is also present in application memory and any query logs.
PoC
- Set a password on any video via the AVideo admin/creator UI.
- Query the database:
SELECT clean_title, video_password FROM videos WHERE video_password != ''; - All video passwords are returned in plaintext — no cracking required.
Alternatively, exploit any of the SQL injection vulnerabilities already reported in this repository to extract the video_password column directly.
Impact
- Type: Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information (CWE-312)
- Severity: High
- Authentication required: No — any database read access (including via SQL injection by unauthenticated users) exposes all passwords
- Impact: Full exposure of all video access passwords; credential reuse attacks against users who share passwords across services
- Fix: Hash video passwords on write using
password_hash($video_password, PASSWORD_BCRYPT)and verify on read usingpassword_verify($_POST['password'], $stored_hash)