FileGator: Missing authorization in POST /upload allows cross-user read and deletion of temporary files
Severity and exploitation
KEV coverage does not rule out exploitation.
Assessment vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:LAssessment vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:LSeverity
medium5.9CVSS measures technical severity, not the likelihood of an attack.
Known exploitation
Not listed in the checked CISA KEV catalog
Absence from CISA KEV does not rule out attacks.
Public exploit
Exploit reference published
Source-linked evidence; not proof of attacks in the wild or independent validation.
Remediation
Package fixes recorded
Fix versions are recorded for 1 of 1 mapped packages. Check each release branch and any separate product guidance.
What this means
POST /upload uses the request-supplied resumableFilename directly as a key into the shared temporary directory, without the character filter it applies to resumableIdentifier and without namespacing it per user. A valid user holding the upload permission can read any file in that directory into their own home directory, append to it, and delete it.
Source excerpt · OSVAttack conditions
No attack-condition excerpt has been identified here. Review the full source description and references for authentication, network access, and configuration requirements.
Review supporting sources →Affected versions
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filegator · GitHub_M
filegator
1 range
filegator · GitHub_M
filegator
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affected
< 7.15.0
Other versions: unknown
Packages
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| Affected range | Recorded fix |
|---|---|
| Earlier releases before 7.15.0Ecosystem versions | 7.15.0 |
Version evidence: OSV · GHSA-44r8-3p76-84mw
View original version evidence (64 explicit versions)
What to do
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Public exploit evidence
The sources identify public exploit references. We have not independently tested them; their availability does not establish exploitation in the wild.
filegator/filegator · security/advisories/GHSA-44r8-3p76-84mw ↗Attributed to CISA-ADPOriginal source description
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Summary
POST /upload uses the request-supplied resumableFilename directly as a key into the shared temporary directory, without the character filter it applies to resumableIdentifier and without namespacing it per user. A valid user holding the upload permission can read any file in that directory into their own home directory, append to it, and delete it.
This reproduces the cross-user batch-archive disclosure of GHSA-f74m-x83r-c4v4 through a different route — it still works with the fix for that advisory (PR #597) applied — and additionally allows deleting the login rate-limit lockfile.
Reported with explicit preconditions and bounded impact, as before: the primitive is confined to the temporary directory, not the whole filesystem.
Details
backend/Controllers/UploadController.php:61—$file_name = $request->input('resumableFilename', 'file')is not passed through thepreg_replace('/[^0-9a-zA-Z_]/', '', ...)that line 66 applies toresumableIdentifier.- Line 88 builds
$prefixnamespaced by the sanitized username, but$file_namereaches the temporary storage at lines 118, 121 and 125 without that prefix. - Line 115 —
if ($chunks_size >= $total_size)is entered wheneverresumableTotalSizeis0. - Lines 116-119 — the assembly loop
for ($i = 1; $i <= $total_chunks; ++$i)does not execute whenresumableTotalChunksis0, so nothing is written to$file_name. - Line 121 —
readStream($file_name)therefore reads the pre-existing temporary file of that exact name. - Line 122 — its contents are stored into the requester's own home directory.
- Line 125 —
remove($file_name)deletes it.
Path traversal outside the temporary directory is prevented by Tmpfs::sanitizeFilename(), so the primitive is bounded to that directory — but every user's transient objects share it.
PoC
Preconditions: a multi-user deployment with distinct per-user homedirs. The attacker is a valid low-privileged user holding upload (a first-class permission in the admin UI, and present in the shipped users.json.blank admin set).
- Victim creates a batch archive via
POST /batchdownload; the JSON response returns the archive id. - Attacker sends one
POST /uploadwithresumableFilename=<victim's id>,resumableTotalChunks=0,resumableTotalSize=0,resumableRelativePath=/, and any small valid file part. - Response is
{"data":"Stored"}. The victim's archive is now byte-identical in the attacker's home directory, retrievable through the ordinaryGET /download. The victim's temporary archive has been deleted.
Verified end to end with a PHPUnit test against current master; the archive contents matched byte for byte. Test file available on request.
Impact
Missing authorization (CWE-862) on temporary storage objects.
- Cross-user disclosure of any transient object whose name the attacker can learn or predict. This includes batch archives — so GHSA-f74m-x83r-c4v4's impact remains reachable even with its fix applied — and the plaintext per-file copies that
ZipArchiver::addFileFromStorage()writes while an archive is being built (those still useuniqid(), which is timestamp-derived). - Arbitrary delete within the temporary directory.
AuthController::login()stores the login rate-limit counter asmd5($ip).'.lock'in that same directory (backend/Controllers/AuthController.php:36, checked at line 44, written at line 58). An attacker can compute their own lockfile name and delete it, defeating the lockout. - Arbitrary append: with
resumableTotalChunks >= 1, line 118write($file_name, ..., true)appends attacker-controlled bytes to an arbitrary existing temporary file.
Remediation
Do not use the request-supplied filename as a storage key. Namespace the assembly file per user — for example reuse the existing $prefix — and carry the display filename separately for the storage->store() call.
Note that simply applying the [^0-9a-zA-Z_] filter to resumableFilename would corrupt legitimate uploads (sample.txt becomes sampletxt), because $final['filename'] is what becomes the stored name. The fix needs the namespacing, not just the filter.
References
6 sourcesInside the record
Evidence available
Describes the evidence in this view, not whether the product is safe.
Original records
CVE-2026-94619View the latest unmodified CVE JSON from the official source. It may be newer than this imported page.
cve.new JSON →Underlying weaknesses
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Contributing organizations · 2
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Timeline
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Source updated
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Last imported by cve.new
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What changed
Follow changes- CVE · CVE-2026-94619
Observed 2026-11-09T13:36:01.925Z · upstream updated 2026-11-09T13:28:10.258Z
Prioritization updated
before
[]
after
[ { "source": "CISA-ADP", "type": "SSVC", "role": "CISA Coordinator", "timestamp": "2026-11-09T13:27:48.589388Z", "decisions": [ { "name": "Exploitation", "value": "poc" }, { "name": "Automatable", "value": "no" }, { "name": "Technical Impact", "value": "partial" } ] } ]
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