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CVE-2026-94618

FileGator: Missing authorization in GET /batchdownload allows cross-user retrieval of another user's archive

Products / packages filegator · filegator/filegator

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Severity and exploitation

Not in CISA KEVSource: MODERATE

KEV coverage does not rule out exploitation.

KEV checked 14/11/2026, 23:05:32 UTC
OSV · CVSS:3.1 · 5.4
Assessment vectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L
GitHub_M · CVSS:3.1 · 5.4
Assessment vectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L
The headline uses the highest imported catalog score. Assessments can differ by source and CVSS version.

Severity

medium5.4

CVSS measures technical severity, not the likelihood of an attack.

Known exploitation

Not listed in the checked CISA KEV catalog

Absence from CISA KEV does not rule out attacks.

Public exploit

Exploit reference published

Source-linked evidence; not proof of attacks in the wild or independent validation.

Remediation

Package fixes recorded

Fix versions are recorded for 1 of 1 mapped packages. Check each release branch and any separate product guidance.

What this means

FileGator versions before 7.15.0 have a missing authorization vulnerability in the GET /batchdownload endpoint, allowing a low-privileged user to download another user's batch archive. The attacker must have a valid session and the uniqid of the target archive. This vulnerability can disclose files across the per-user home-directory boundary in multi-user deployments.

Summarized by @cf/meta/llama-3.3-70b-instruct-fp8-fast. Verify details against the original sources.

Attack conditions

No attack-condition excerpt has been identified here. Review the full source description and references for authentication, network access, and configuration requirements.

Review supporting sources →

Affected versions

Check the exact model, release, and any platform requirements against your installation.

filegator · GitHub_M

filegator

1 range

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affected

< 7.15.0

unaffected

unknown

Other versions: unknown

Packages

Compare each installed version with the publisher’s affected ranges. Where a fix is recorded, choose the appropriate release branch and test compatibility before upgrading.

Affected range Recorded fix
Earlier releases before 7.15.0Ecosystem versions7.15.0

Version evidence: OSV · GHSA-f74m-x83r-c4v4

View original version evidence (64 explicit versions)

What to do

Compare your installed product and version with the affected versions above. A matching product name alone does not confirm exposure.

Use the recorded fix for your release branch. Review the publisher’s instructions and test compatibility before upgrading.

cve.new guidance unless attributed to a publisher. This page does not inspect your installation.

Public exploit evidence

The sources identify public exploit references. We have not independently tested them; their availability does not establish exploitation in the wild.

filegator/filegator · security/advisories/GHSA-f74m-x83r-c4v4 ↗Attributed to CISA-ADP

Original source description

Read the full publisher description

Summary

GET /batchdownload streams a batch ZIP to any requester who supplies its uniqid, without checking that the current user/session created it. In deployments where users have separate home directories, a valid low-privileged user who obtains an active archive id can download another user's batch archive, disclosing files the per-user boundary otherwise protects. Reported with explicit preconditions and bounded impact — not a universal "any user steals any file" issue.

Details

The archive id is generated with plain uniqid() and no ownership metadata is bound to it before streaming.

  • backend/Services/Archiver/Adapters/ZipArchiver.php:44 — createArchive() uses plain uniqid().
  • backend/Controllers/DownloadController.php:144-145 — batchDownloadStart() reads the tmpfs file by the request-supplied uniqid after only a charset preg_replace().
  • backend/Controllers/DownloadController.php:158 — the tmpfs archive is removed only after streaming.
  • backend/Controllers/routes.php:207-226 — both batch endpoints are exposed to normal roles with read, download, batchdownload.

No user id, session id, home directory, or creator check is applied before streaming. The code path is unchanged since commit 3f03a40 (2022-05-31) and is present in the latest release v7.14.3.

PoC

Preconditions: a multi-user deployment with distinct per-user homedirs (set per-user in users.json, or private_repos => true on the WordPress/LDAP adapter). The shipped sample config (admin/guest both at /, guest with no perms) does not create this boundary on its own. Attacker is a valid user with read, download, batchdownload.

  1. User John (homedir /john) creates secret.txt, signs in, and creates a batch archive via POST /batchdownload. The JSON response returns the archive uniqid.
  2. User Jane (homedir /jane, with batchdownload) signs in normally.
  3. Jane's direct GET /download of /secret.txt returns 302 — the normal home-directory boundary blocks the file.
  4. Jane sends GET /batchdownload?uniqid=<John's id> and receives a valid ZIP containing secret.txt with John's content.

A PHPUnit proof with two real sessions reproduces this end to end (OK, 3 tests / 29 assertions), plus a lifecycle test (OK, 2 tests / 9 assertions). Full test files, run logs, and a real Apache access-log replay demo are available on request.

Lifetime / acquisition: a normal completed download removes the archive at the end of streaming, limiting the window. An aborted/failed download leaves the archive in tmpfs (cleanup never reached). The frontend issues the download as a top-level navigation (window.open('.../batchdownload&uniqid='+ret.uniqid, '_blank')), so the id appears in standard web access logs. That access-log path only adds meaningful impact when log visibility is decoupled from host filesystem access (e.g. a log-aggregation/shared-hosting/downstream-sink reader) and the archive is still alive; if the reader is ops/root on the same host they can already read the storage tree directly. The uniqid() token is timestamp-derived (1,000,000-value space per known second) — included to justify a CSPRNG, not presented as a practical universal brute force.

Impact

Missing authorization (CWE-862) on a temporary download object, leading to cross-user file disclosure across the per-user home-directory boundary in configured multi-user deployments. Secondary effect: a successful replay deletes the victim's pending archive (the GET removes the tmpfs file after streaming), denying the victim their own download if not yet consumed.

Remediation: generate ids with bin2hex(random_bytes(32)); store creator user/session + home dir + expiry per archive id; verify the requester matches before streaming and return 403/404 on mismatch or unknown/expired id; delete metadata with the tmpfs file.

References

6 sources

Inside the record

Evidence available

Package identity
Version evidence
Remediation guidance · not supplied
Weakness classification
Additional publishers

Describes the evidence in this view, not whether the product is safe.

Original records

CVE-2026-94618

View the latest unmodified CVE JSON from the official source. It may be newer than this imported page.

cve.new JSON →

Underlying weaknesses

The source’s classification of what caused the vulnerability.

CWE-330 ↗

CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values

GitHub_M

Related →
CWE-862 ↗

CWE-862: Missing Authorization

GitHub_M

Related →
Contributing organizations · 2
GitHub_M

Assigning organization

2026-11-06
CISA-ADP

Additional data publisher

2026-11-10

Timeline

All times UTC
  1. Advisory published

    Publication date supplied by the source.

  2. Source updated

    Latest modification date supplied by the source.

  3. Last imported by cve.new

    Latest catalog import, not the date we first saw this advisory.

What changed

Follow changes
  1. CVE · CVE-2026-94618

    Observed 2026-11-10T22:59:57.514Z · upstream updated 2026-11-10T20:19:21.659Z

    Prioritization updated

    before

    []

    after

    [
      {
        "source": "CISA-ADP",
        "type": "SSVC",
        "role": "CISA Coordinator",
        "timestamp": "2026-11-10T20:18:24.532439Z",
        "decisions": [
          {
            "name": "Exploitation",
            "value": "poc"
          },
          {
            "name": "Automatable",
            "value": "no"
          },
          {
            "name": "Technical Impact",
            "value": "partial"
          }
        ]
      }
    ]

Large field values are marked as truncated previews. Original source snapshots remain retained.

Showing up to 50 most recent observed changes.