FileGator: Missing authorization in GET /batchdownload allows cross-user retrieval of another user's archive
Severity and exploitation
KEV coverage does not rule out exploitation.
Assessment vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:LAssessment vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:LSeverity
medium5.4CVSS measures technical severity, not the likelihood of an attack.
Known exploitation
Not listed in the checked CISA KEV catalog
Absence from CISA KEV does not rule out attacks.
Public exploit
Exploit reference published
Source-linked evidence; not proof of attacks in the wild or independent validation.
Remediation
Package fixes recorded
Fix versions are recorded for 1 of 1 mapped packages. Check each release branch and any separate product guidance.
What this means
FileGator versions before 7.15.0 have a missing authorization vulnerability in the GET /batchdownload endpoint, allowing a low-privileged user to download another user's batch archive. The attacker must have a valid session and the uniqid of the target archive. This vulnerability can disclose files across the per-user home-directory boundary in multi-user deployments.
Summarized by @cf/meta/llama-3.3-70b-instruct-fp8-fast. Verify details against the original sources.Attack conditions
No attack-condition excerpt has been identified here. Review the full source description and references for authentication, network access, and configuration requirements.
Review supporting sources →Affected versions
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filegator · GitHub_M
filegator
1 range
filegator · GitHub_M
filegator
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affected
< 7.15.0
Other versions: unknown
Packages
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| Affected range | Recorded fix |
|---|---|
| Earlier releases before 7.15.0Ecosystem versions | 7.15.0 |
Version evidence: OSV · GHSA-f74m-x83r-c4v4
View original version evidence (64 explicit versions)
What to do
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Public exploit evidence
The sources identify public exploit references. We have not independently tested them; their availability does not establish exploitation in the wild.
filegator/filegator · security/advisories/GHSA-f74m-x83r-c4v4 ↗Attributed to CISA-ADPOriginal source description
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Summary
GET /batchdownload streams a batch ZIP to any requester who supplies its uniqid, without checking that the current user/session created it. In deployments where users have separate home directories, a valid low-privileged user who obtains an active archive id can download another user's batch archive, disclosing files the per-user boundary otherwise protects. Reported with explicit preconditions and bounded impact — not a universal "any user steals any file" issue.
Details
The archive id is generated with plain uniqid() and no ownership metadata is bound to it before streaming.
backend/Services/Archiver/Adapters/ZipArchiver.php:44—createArchive()uses plainuniqid().backend/Controllers/DownloadController.php:144-145—batchDownloadStart()reads the tmpfs file by the request-supplieduniqidafter only a charsetpreg_replace().backend/Controllers/DownloadController.php:158— the tmpfs archive is removed only after streaming.backend/Controllers/routes.php:207-226— both batch endpoints are exposed to normal roles withread,download,batchdownload.
No user id, session id, home directory, or creator check is applied before streaming. The code path is unchanged since commit 3f03a40 (2022-05-31) and is present in the latest release v7.14.3.
PoC
Preconditions: a multi-user deployment with distinct per-user homedirs (set per-user in users.json, or private_repos => true on the WordPress/LDAP adapter). The shipped sample config (admin/guest both at /, guest with no perms) does not create this boundary on its own. Attacker is a valid user with read, download, batchdownload.
- User John (
homedir /john) createssecret.txt, signs in, and creates a batch archive viaPOST /batchdownload. The JSON response returns the archiveuniqid. - User Jane (
homedir /jane, withbatchdownload) signs in normally. - Jane's direct
GET /downloadof/secret.txtreturns302— the normal home-directory boundary blocks the file. - Jane sends
GET /batchdownload?uniqid=<John's id>and receives a valid ZIP containingsecret.txtwith John's content.
A PHPUnit proof with two real sessions reproduces this end to end (OK, 3 tests / 29 assertions), plus a lifecycle test (OK, 2 tests / 9 assertions). Full test files, run logs, and a real Apache access-log replay demo are available on request.
Lifetime / acquisition: a normal completed download removes the archive at the end of streaming, limiting the window. An aborted/failed download leaves the archive in tmpfs (cleanup never reached). The frontend issues the download as a top-level navigation (window.open('.../batchdownload&uniqid='+ret.uniqid, '_blank')), so the id appears in standard web access logs. That access-log path only adds meaningful impact when log visibility is decoupled from host filesystem access (e.g. a log-aggregation/shared-hosting/downstream-sink reader) and the archive is still alive; if the reader is ops/root on the same host they can already read the storage tree directly. The uniqid() token is timestamp-derived (1,000,000-value space per known second) — included to justify a CSPRNG, not presented as a practical universal brute force.
Impact
Missing authorization (CWE-862) on a temporary download object, leading to cross-user file disclosure across the per-user home-directory boundary in configured multi-user deployments. Secondary effect: a successful replay deletes the victim's pending archive (the GET removes the tmpfs file after streaming), denying the victim their own download if not yet consumed.
Remediation: generate ids with bin2hex(random_bytes(32)); store creator user/session + home dir + expiry per archive id; verify the requester matches before streaming and return 403/404 on mismatch or unknown/expired id; delete metadata with the tmpfs file.
References
6 sourcesInside the record
Evidence available
Describes the evidence in this view, not whether the product is safe.
Original records
CVE-2026-94618View the latest unmodified CVE JSON from the official source. It may be newer than this imported page.
cve.new JSON →Underlying weaknesses
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Contributing organizations · 2
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What changed
Follow changes- CVE · CVE-2026-94618
Observed 2026-11-10T22:59:57.514Z · upstream updated 2026-11-10T20:19:21.659Z
Prioritization updated
before
[]
after
[ { "source": "CISA-ADP", "type": "SSVC", "role": "CISA Coordinator", "timestamp": "2026-11-10T20:18:24.532439Z", "decisions": [ { "name": "Exploitation", "value": "poc" }, { "name": "Automatable", "value": "no" }, { "name": "Technical Impact", "value": "partial" } ] } ]
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