Wild Apricot Login <= 1.0.18 - Authentication Bypass via SSO Email-Collision Account Binding on Multisite
Impact
Wild Apricot Login plugin versions up to 1.0.18 have an authentication bypass weakness. An attacker with custom-level WildApricot membership access can authenticate as a WordPress subsite administrator without credentials if they control a WildApricot contact with a matching email address. This requires access to a WildApricot organization and completion of the SSO flow on a subsite.
Summarized by @cf/meta/llama-3.3-70b-instruct-fp8-fast. Verify details against the original sources.Exploitation requires that the attacker control a WildApricot contact whose email address matches the target WordPress administrator's email — achievable via a public zero-fee membership application on the connected WildApricot organization — and that they complete the SSO flow on any subsite where Wild Apricot Login is active; because WordPress user identities and authentication cookies are network-global, the cookie issued on that subsite is equally valid on any other subsite where the victim user holds an administrator role.
Affected packages
Affected products
Vendor version evidence. Product records are separate from automatic dependency matching.
wild-apricot · Wordfence
Wild Apricot Login
1 range
wild-apricot · Wordfence
Wild Apricot Login
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affected
0 → through 1.0.18
semver versions
Other versions: unaffected
Original source description
The Wild Apricot Login plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via SSO Email-Collision Account Binding in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.18. When no WildApricot contact-ID mapping is found for an incoming SSO login, the plugin falls back to a network-global get_user_by('email', ...) lookup in Module.php to resolve a WordPress user, then UserSynchronizer::syncWaContact() binds and Controller::login() issues a session cookie via wp_set_auth_cookie() for that resolved user — both guarded only by is_super_admin() — without ever requiring proof of ownership of the matched WordPress account such as a password, local account-linking confirmation, inbox verification, or administrator approval. This makes it possible for attackers with custom-level WildApricot membership access to authenticate as an existing WordPress subsite administrator on a path-based Multisite network, obtaining a valid network-global authentication cookie for the victim without their credentials. Exploitation requires that the attacker control a WildApricot contact whose email address matches the target WordPress administrator's email — achievable via a public zero-fee membership application on the connected WildApricot organization — and that they complete the SSO flow on any subsite where Wild Apricot Login is active; because WordPress user identities and authentication cookies are network-global, the cookie issued on that subsite is equally valid on any other subsite where the victim user holds an administrator role.
Inside the record
Evidence available
Describes the evidence in this view, not whether the product is safe.
Original records
CVE-2026-93757View the latest unmodified CVE JSON from the official source. It may be newer than this imported page.
cve.new JSON →Underlying weaknesses
The source’s classification of what caused the vulnerability.
Contributing organizations · 2
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Additional data publisher
What changed
Follow changesLarge field values are marked as truncated previews. Original source snapshots remain retained.