Bluetooth Classic AVRCP Target: missing TX cleanup on disconnect permanently stalls vendor-dependent responses and leaks them to the next peer
Severity and exploitation
KEV coverage does not rule out exploitation.
Assessment vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:LSeverity
medium4.6CVSS measures technical severity, not the likelihood of an attack.
Known exploitation
Not listed in the checked CISA KEV catalog
Absence from CISA KEV does not rule out attacks.
Public exploit
Not established by this record
Missing evidence does not mean no public exploit exists.
Remediation
Fix status not established
No structured fix or guidance is available here. Check the latest publisher advisory.
What this means
Zephyr 4.4.0 is affected by a vulnerability where a paired peer can trigger a persistent loss of AVRCP Target function by dropping the ACL link during a fragmented response. The next connection may also receive leaked response buffers. A reboot is required to recover.
Summarized by @cf/meta/llama-3.3-70b-instruct-fp8-fast. Verify details against the original sources.Attack conditions
The AVCTP control channel requires an encrypted BR/EDR link (BT_SECURITY_L2), so the attacker must be a paired peer within radio range; no user interaction is needed.
Excerpt from the original source description below.
Review supporting sources →Affected versions
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zephyrproject · zephyr
zephyr
1 range
zephyrproject · zephyr
zephyr
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affected
4.4.0 → before 4.5.0
semver versions
Other versions: unaffected
What to do
Compare your installed product and version with the affected versions above. A matching product name alone does not confirm exposure.
No structured fix or remediation guidance is available here. Check the full source description and vendor’s latest advisory for a patch or workaround; do not assume another version is safe.
cve.new guidance unless attributed to a publisher. This page does not inspect your installation.
Public exploit evidence
No public exploit reference is identified in the imported evidence. This is not a claim that no exploit exists.
Original source description
Read the full publisher description
The AVRCP Target role in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/avrcp.c keeps its vendor-dependent response transmit state in a per-connection object selected by connection index (get_avrcp_tg()), with the per-transfer context (tid, sent_len, and the BT_AVRCP_TG_FLAG_TX_ONGOING flag) stored in the user_data of the queued response net_buf. The AVCTP teardown handler avrcp_disconnected() did not cancel tg->vd_rsp_tx_work and did not release the buffers still queued on tg->vd_rsp_tx_pending, so a link drop in the middle of a fragmented response left the buffer on the list with TX_ONGOING still set.
A remote AVRCP Controller can trigger this deterministically: it issues a vendor-dependent command whose response exceeds one AVRCP fragment (for example GetElementAttributes or GetCapabilities), lets bt_avrcp_tg_vendor_tx_work() emit the START fragment, and then drops the ACL link instead of sending REQUEST_CONTINUING_RESPONSE. The AVCTP control channel requires an encrypted BR/EDR link (BT_SECURITY_L2), so the attacker must be a paired peer within radio range; no user interaction is needed.
Because the Target objects are static and reused, the next connection landing on the same connection index finds the stale buffer at the head of vd_rsp_tx_pending. Every run of the TX work sees TX_ONGOING and returns immediately, so all further vendor-dependent responses queue behind the stale head and are never sent — a persistent loss of AVRCP Target function that no timeout clears and only a reboot recovers. Each cycle also leaks one response buffer from a shallow application pool, and a new peer that sends REQUEST_CONTINUING_RESPONSE clears the stale TX_ONGOING via bt_avrcp_tg_process_continuing_cmd(), causing the un-sent remainder of the previous peer's response to be transmitted to it.
The fix cancels tg->vd_rsp_tx_work and unrefs every buffer on tg->vd_rsp_tx_pending in avrcp_disconnected(); since the TX context lives in the buffer user_data, releasing the buffers also resets the TX state machine. There is no memory corruption: the pre-fix buffer is leaked with a live reference, so no use-after-free arises.
References
2 sourcesInside the record
Evidence available
Describes the evidence in this view, not whether the product is safe.
Original records
CVE-2026-85033View the latest unmodified CVE JSON from the official source. It may be newer than this imported page.
cve.new JSON →Underlying weaknesses
The source’s classification of what caused the vulnerability.
Contributing organizations · 2
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Timeline
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Source updated
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Last imported by cve.new
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What changed
Follow changes- CVE · CVE-2026-85033
Observed 2026-11-03T18:20:54.755Z · upstream updated 2026-11-03T18:15:47.700Z
Prioritization updated
before
[]
after
[ { "source": "CISA-ADP", "type": "SSVC", "role": "CISA Coordinator", "timestamp": "2026-11-03T18:15:37.681298Z", "decisions": [ { "name": "Exploitation", "value": "none" }, { "name": "Automatable", "value": "no" }, { "name": "Technical Impact", "value": "partial" } ] } ]
Large field values are marked as truncated previews. Original source snapshots remain retained.
Showing up to 50 most recent observed changes.