Apache Wicket: Configured upload limits are not enforced by the standalone file upload resource
Severity and exploitation
KEV coverage does not rule out exploitation.
Assessment vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NSeverity
high8.3CVSS measures technical severity, not the likelihood of an attack.
Known exploitation
Not listed in the checked CISA KEV catalog
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Public exploit
Not established by this record
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Remediation
Fix status not established
No structured fix or guidance is available here. Check the latest publisher advisory.
What this means
Apache Wicket versions 9.14.0 through 9.24.0 and 10.0.0 through 10.9.1 have a weakness where configured upload limits are not enforced by the standalone file upload resource, allowing unauthenticated requests to consume excessive disk or heap space. The issue affects applications using FileUploadToResourceField or mounted FileUploadResourceReference. No authorization is required for exploitation.
Summarized by @cf/meta/llama-3.3-70b-instruct-fp8-fast. Verify details against the original sources.Attack conditions
No attack-condition excerpt has been identified here. Review the full source description and references for authentication, network access, and configuration requirements.
Review supporting sources →Affected versions
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Apache Software Foundation · apache
Apache Wicket
2 ranges
Apache Software Foundation · apache
Apache Wicket
Package identity
pkg:maven/org.apache.wicket/wicket-coreExplore org.apache.wicket:wicket-core →Identity supplied by apache. Version matching requires compatible range evidence.
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affected
9.14.0 → through 9.24.0
semver versions
10.0.0 → through 10.9.1
semver versions
Other versions: unaffected
What to do
Compare your installed product and version with the affected versions above. A matching product name alone does not confirm exposure.
No structured fix or remediation guidance is available here. Check the full source description and vendor’s latest advisory for a patch or workaround; do not assume another version is safe.
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Public exploit evidence
No public exploit reference is identified in the imported evidence. This is not a claim that no exploit exists.
Original source description
Read the full publisher description
Allocation of resources without limits or throttling in Apache Wicket.
org.apache.wicket.markup.html.form.upload.resource.AbstractFileUploadResource is the server side of the form-less upload offered by FileUploadToResourceField, which posts the selected files to a separately mounted resource rather than through a Form. The resource is an application-wide singleton with no component to consult, so newResourceResponse() takes the three limits that bound the upload - the total request size, the maximum size of a single part and the maximum number of parts - from the request parameters maxSize, fileMaxSize and fileCountMax, and hands them to the multipart parser as they arrive. Nothing binds those numbers to the field that is supposed to be uploading. A request naming a very large maxSize is therefore parsed with no effective ceiling on the total size, and omitting fileMaxSize and fileCountMax leaves the per-part and part-count limits unset as well. The values the application configured through FileUploadToResourceField#setMaxSize(), #setFileMaxSize() and #setFileCountMax() are consulted only when the client omits the corresponding parameter, so against a client that supplies one they have no effect at all.
Parts above the parser's in-memory threshold are spooled to the container's temporary directory, and the file parts are then copied into the folder the application's IUploadsFileManager owns, under a sub-folder the request names, where they remain. A part that is not a file is read into the heap in full while the request is parsed. One request, repeatable, can therefore consume as much disk or as much heap as the client chooses to send. The resource carries no authorization annotation and the default authorization strategy permits every resource request, so unless the application authorizes the resource itself the request needs no authentication, no session, no prior page view and no user interaction.
An application is affected where it uses FileUploadToResourceField, or mounts FileUploadResourceReference itself. This is not the ordinary upload path: the resource is a singleton that has to be created and mounted deliberately. An application that configures no upload limit at all loses nothing, because Wicket applies no total-size limit of its own by default; what the defect removes is a limit the application set. Uploads through Form with FileUploadField, and through AjaxFileDropBehavior, are not affected, because both read their limits from the component rather than from the request. The upload resource does not exist in the 8.x line.
This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 9.14.0 through 9.24.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.9.1. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 9.25.0 or 10.12.0, which fix the issue.
References
1 sourcesInside the record
Evidence available
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Original records
CVE-2026-84170View the latest unmodified CVE JSON from the official source. It may be newer than this imported page.
cve.new JSON →Underlying weaknesses
The source’s classification of what caused the vulnerability.
Contributing organizations · 2
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Timeline
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What changed
Follow changes- CVE · CVE-2026-84170
Observed 2026-11-06T15:01:58.613Z · upstream updated 2026-11-06T14:44:59.262Z
Prioritization updated
before
[]
after
[ { "source": "CISA-ADP", "type": "SSVC", "role": "CISA Coordinator", "timestamp": "2026-11-06T14:44:37.230714Z", "decisions": [ { "name": "Exploitation", "value": "none" }, { "name": "Automatable", "value": "no" }, { "name": "Technical Impact", "value": "partial" } ] } ]
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