CVE-2026-82976

Image-customization-controller: unauthenticated plaintext image server with directory listing exposes ignition images containing cluster pull secret

Products / packages Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4 · Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 5

Published 03/11/2026, 18:36:24 UTC

Severity and exploitation

Not in CISA KEV

KEV coverage does not rule out exploitation.

KEV checked 05/11/2026, 06:00:33 UTC

redhat · CVSS:3.1 · 7.1

Assessment vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

Severity

high7.1

CVSS measures technical severity, not the likelihood of an attack.

Known exploitation

Not listed in the checked CISA KEV catalog

Absence from CISA KEV does not rule out attacks.

Public exploit

Not established by this record

Missing evidence does not mean no public exploit exists.

Remediation

Source guidance available

Review the recorded instructions. Guidance may be a workaround rather than a fixed version.

What this means

The image-customization-controller in OpenShift's bare metal provisioning stack has an unauthenticated HTTP file server with directory listing, exposing ignition images containing cluster pull secrets. An adjacent network attacker can enumerate and download images, extracting the embedded Ignition config and recovering secrets. The affected product is Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4 and 5.

Summarized by @cf/meta/llama-3.3-70b-instruct-fp8-fast. Verify details against the original sources.

Attack conditions

No attack-condition excerpt has been identified here. Review the full source description and references for authentication, network access, and configuration requirements.

Review supporting sources →

Affected versions

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Red Hat · redhat

Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4

0 ranges

redhat version evidence

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Other versions: affected

Product identifiers (CPE)

cpe:/a:redhat:openshift:4

Red Hat · redhat

Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4

0 ranges

redhat version evidence

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Other versions: affected

Product identifiers (CPE)

cpe:/a:redhat:openshift:4

Red Hat · redhat

Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 5

0 ranges

redhat version evidence

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Other versions: affected

Product identifiers (CPE)

cpe:/a:redhat:openshift:5

Automatic dependency matching is unavailable for this record. Use the product evidence and publisher’s instructions to check your installation.

What to do

Compare your installed product and version with the affected versions above. A matching product name alone does not confirm exposure.

There is no way to disable the directory listing or add authentication without a code change. As a workaround, administrators can apply network-level controls to restrict access to port 8084 on the image-customization-controller pod to only the BMC/provisioning network hosts that require it. Use NetworkPolicy or firewall rules to block access from workload pods. Additionally, rotate any pull secrets and SSH keys that may have been exposed if unauthorized access to the provisioning network is suspected.

--- CME Mitigation Guidance (2026-11-04) --- Disclaimer: The following mitigation solutions are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from https://cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure.

The highest-value action is to enforce NetworkPolicy to restrict ingress traffic to port 8084 on the image-customization-controller pod, isolating the unauthenticated HTTP file server from cluster workloads: upgrade to the fixed Openshift4/Ose Image Customization Controller Rhel/Openshift5/Ose Image Customization Controller Rhel builds, which apply the documented input check, closing all 2 injection vectors (HTTP root directory listing enumeration, unauthenticated image retrieval and secret extraction). Until patched, this is a concern on OpenShift bare metal IPI clusters running the image-customization-controller, so Apply NetworkPolicy or firewall rules to restrict port 8084 access strictly to authorized BMC and provisioning network hosts, blocking workload pods from accessing the service. As a compensating measure, Rotate exposed cluster pull secrets and ramdisk SSH keys to limit their operational validity window if unauthorized provisioning network access is suspected. These controls limit blast radius and contain exploitation, but they do not fix the underlying unauthenticated directory listing exposure defect — apply the upstream patch to fully remediate.

Highest-impact CME: CME-805 Credential Rotation Policy (medium)

redhat guidance ↗

cve.new guidance unless attributed to a publisher. This page does not inspect your installation.

Public exploit evidence

No public exploit reference is identified in the imported evidence. This is not a claim that no exploit exists.

Original source description

Read the full publisher description

A flaw was found in the image-customization-controller used in OpenShift's bare metal provisioning stack. The controller registers an HTTP file server on port 8084 with no authentication. The custom imageFileSystem implementation exposes a browsable HTML directory listing of all registered images at the root path. The only access control on per-host images is the random UUID filename; the directory listing discloses those UUIDs to any caller on the provisioning network. Each served image embeds an Ignition config containing the base64-encoded cluster pull secret, optional IRONIC_RAMDISK_SSH_KEY, proxy settings, and per-host NetworkManager keyfiles. An adjacent network attacker can enumerate all image UUIDs via directory listing, download any image, extract the embedded Ignition config, and recover the cluster pull secret and SSH key.

Evidence

pkg/imagehandler/imagefilesystem.go — root directory is browsable and enumerates all UUID image names

func (f *imageFileSystem) Readdir(n int) ([]fs.FileInfo, error) {
    f.mu.Lock()
    defer f.mu.Unlock()
    result := []fs.FileInfo{}
    for _, im := range f.images {
        result = append(result, im)
    }
    return result, nil
}

func (f *imageFileSystem) Open(name string) (http.File, error) {
    f.log.Info("Open", "path", name)
    if name == "/" {
        return f, nil
    }
    ...

cmd/controller/main.go — file server bound on all interfaces without auth or TLS

http.Handle("/", http.FileServer(imageServer.FileSystem()))

go func() {
    server := &http.Server{
        Addr:              imagesBindAddr,   // default ":8084"
        ReadHeaderTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
    }
    err := server.ListenAndServe()

pkg/ignition/service_config.go:94-100 — pull secret is embedded in every served image

func (b *ignitionBuilder) authFile() ignition_config_types_32.File {
    source := "data:;base64," + strings.TrimSpace(b.ironicAgentPullSecret)
    return ignition_config_types_32.File{
        Node: ignition_config_types_32.Node{Path: "/etc/authfile.json"},
        ...

Attack Pattern

Adjacent provisioning-network client → GET / lists UUID image names → download ISO/initramfs → extract embedded Ignition → recover cluster pull secret and SSH key.

References

4 sources

access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-82976

Security advisoryredhat

bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi

Source referenceredhat

openshift/image-customization-controller · repository

Source referenceredhat

redhat.atlassian.net/browse/OCPBUGS-105396

Source referenceredhat

Inside the record

Evidence available

Package identity · not supplied

Version evidence · not supplied

Remediation guidance

Weakness classification

Additional publishers · not supplied

Describes the evidence in this view, not whether the product is safe.

Original records

CVE-2026-82976

View the latest unmodified CVE JSON from the official source. It may be newer than this imported page.

cve.new JSON →

Underlying weaknesses

The source’s classification of what caused the vulnerability.

CWE-548 ↗

Exposure of Information Through Directory Listing

redhat

Contributing organizations · 1

redhat

Assigning organization

2026-11-05

Timeline

All times UTC

3 Nov 2026, 18:36
Advisory published
Publication date supplied by the source.
5 Nov 2026, 02:19
Source updated
Latest modification date supplied by the source.
5 Nov 2026, 03:20
Last imported by cve.new
Latest catalog import, not the date we first saw this advisory.

What changed

Follow changes

CVE · CVE-2026-829762026-11-05

Observed 2026-11-05T03:20:40.953Z · upstream updated 2026-11-05T02:19:12.537Z

Remediation guidance changed

before

[
  {
    "text": "There is no way to disable the directory listing or add authentication without a code change. As a workaround, administrators can apply network-level controls to restrict access to port 8084 on the image-customization-controller pod to only the BMC/provisioning network hosts that require it. Use NetworkPolicy or firewall rules to block access from workload pods. Additionally, rotate any pull secrets and SSH keys that may have been exposed if unauthorized access to the provisioning network is suspected.",
    "source": "redhat",
    "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-82976"
  }
]

after

[
  {
    "text": "There is no way to disable the directory listing or add authentication without a code change. As a workaround, administrators can apply network-level controls to restrict access to port 8084 on the image-customization-controller pod to only the BMC/provisioning network hosts that require it. Use NetworkPolicy or firewall rules to block access from workload pods. Additionally, rotate any pull secrets and SSH keys that may have been exposed if unauthorized access to the provisioning network is suspected.\n\n--- CME Mitigation Guidance (2026-11-04) ---\nDisclaimer: The following mitigation solutions are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from https://cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure.\n\nThe highest-value action is to enforce NetworkPolicy to restrict ingress traffic to port 8084 on the image-customization-controller pod, isolating the unauthenticated HTTP file server from cluster workloads: upgrade to the fixed Openshift4/Ose Image Customization Controller Rhel/Openshift5/Ose Image Customization Controller Rhel builds, which apply the documented input check, closing all 2 injection vectors (HTTP root directory listing enumeration, unauthenticated image retrieval and secret extraction). Until patched, this is a concern on OpenShift bare metal IPI clusters running the image-customization-controller, so Apply NetworkPolicy or firewall rules to restrict port 8084 access strictly to authorized BMC and provisioning network hosts, blocking workload pods from accessing the service. As a compensating measure, Rotate exposed cluster pull secrets and ramdisk SSH keys to limit their operational validity window if unauthorized provisioning network access is suspected. These controls limit blast radius and contain exploitation, but they do not fix the underlying unauthenticated directory listing exposure defect — apply the upstream patch to fully remediate.\n\nHighest-impact CME: CME-805 Credential Rotation Policy (medium)",
    "source": "redhat",
    "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-82976"
  }
]

Large field values are marked as truncated previews. Original source snapshots remain retained.

Showing up to 50 most recent observed changes.

Reading the signals

Severity · CVSS: Technical impact and attack conditions. The headline is the highest imported catalog score; sources may disagree.
Observed exploitation · KEV: An absent or unavailable KEV listing does not establish that exploitation has not occurred.
Predicted exploitation · EPSS: No EPSS estimate available in this record.

Record identifiers

Aliases: None recorded

Source evidence

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CVE CVE-2026-82976

Enrichment coverage

NVDAvailable

Checked 03/11/2026, 19:20:32 UTC

GHSANo result

Checked 03/11/2026, 19:20:31 UTC

EUVDNo result

Checked 03/11/2026, 19:20:32 UTC

EPSSNo result

Checked 03/11/2026, 19:20:32 UTC

Additional source evidence

NVD · CVE-2026-82976

CVSS 7.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

Checked 03/11/2026, 19:20:32 UTC

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Image-customization-controller: unauthenticated plaintext image server with directory listing exposes ignition images containing cluster pull secret

Severity and exploitation

What this means

Attack conditions

Affected versions

Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4

affected

unaffected

unknown

Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4

affected

unaffected

unknown

Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 5

affected

unaffected

unknown

What to do

Public exploit evidence

Original source description

Evidence

Attack Pattern

References

Inside the record

Evidence available

Original records

Underlying weaknesses

Timeline

Advisory published

Source updated

Last imported by cve.new

What changed