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CVE-2026-82898

Apache Wicket: A cross-origin listener invocation stopped by a login wall is replayed after the user signs in

Products / packages Apache Software Foundation Apache Wicket

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Severity and exploitation

Not in CISA KEV

KEV coverage does not rule out exploitation.

KEV checked 15/11/2026, 00:00:32 UTC
apache · CVSS:4.0 · 2.1
Assessment vectorCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Severity

low2.1

CVSS measures technical severity, not the likelihood of an attack.

Known exploitation

Not listed in the checked CISA KEV catalog

Absence from CISA KEV does not rule out attacks.

Public exploit

Not established by this record

Missing evidence does not mean no public exploit exists.

Remediation

Fix status not established

No structured fix or guidance is available here. Check the latest publisher advisory.

What this means

Apache Wicket versions 9.1.0 through 9.24.0 and 10.0.0 through 10.11.0 have an incorrect order of security checks, allowing a cross-origin listener invocation to be replayed after a user signs in. An attacker with access to the application can invoke a listener with unauthorized parameters. The issue is mitigated by upgrading to version 9.25.0 or 10.12.0.

Summarized by @cf/meta/llama-3.3-70b-instruct-fp8-fast. Verify details against the original sources.

Attack conditions

No attack-condition excerpt has been identified here. Review the full source description and references for authentication, network access, and configuration requirements.

Review supporting sources →

Affected versions

Check the exact model, release, and any platform requirements against your installation.

Apache Software Foundation · apache

Apache Wicket

2 ranges

Package identity

pkg:maven/org.apache.wicket/wicket-coreExplore org.apache.wicket:wicket-core →

Identity supplied by apache. Version matching requires compatible range evidence.

Compare with this publisher’s ranges. This does not inspect your installation.

affected

9.1.0 → through 9.24.0

semver versions

10.0.0 → through 10.11.0

semver versions

unaffected

unknown

Other versions: unaffected

Automatic dependency matching is unavailable for this record. Use the product evidence and publisher’s instructions to check your installation.

What to do

Compare your installed product and version with the affected versions above. A matching product name alone does not confirm exposure.

No structured fix or remediation guidance is available here. Check the full source description and vendor’s latest advisory for a patch or workaround; do not assume another version is safe.

cve.new guidance unless attributed to a publisher. This page does not inspect your installation.

Public exploit evidence

No public exploit reference is identified in the imported evidence. This is not a claim that no exploit exists.

Original source description

Read the full publisher description

Incorrect order of security checks in Apache Wicket.

org.apache.wicket.protocol.http.ResourceIsolationRequestCycleListener obtains the page a request targets before it consults its resource isolation policies, because those policies are passed that page. Obtaining the page instantiates it, and instantiating a page runs the configured org.apache.wicket.authorization.IAuthorizationStrategy. An application that refuses an unauthenticated visitor by throwing org.apache.wicket.RestartResponseAtInterceptPageException therefore throws it from inside the isolation listener, before any policy has run. That exception replaces the request handler, so the policies are never consulted and a request that came from another origin is not refused.

The exception's constructor stores the URL of the request it interrupted, so that Component#continueToOriginalDestination() can resume it once the visitor has signed in. The stored URL is the one the policies would have refused. On sign in Wicket redirects to it, and that redirect is same-origin, so the policies allow it and the listener runs in the newly authenticated session. The whole URL is stored, its query string included, so an ordinary org.apache.wicket.markup.html.form.Form is resumed with the field values the original request carried in its query string and Form#onSubmit() runs with values another origin chose. A form POST is not needed for this; a plain top-level navigation carries them.

An application is affected where it registers ResourceIsolationRequestCycleListener, which is opt-in and is not registered by default, and where it refuses unauthorized access with RestartResponseAtInterceptPageException followed by continueToOriginalDestination(). No application override is involved on that path: IAuthorizationStrategy#isInstantiationAuthorized() documents throwing that exception, org.apache.wicket.authroles.authentication.AuthenticatedWebApplication throws it and org.apache.wicket.authroles.authentication.panel.UsernamePasswordPanel continues to the original destination, and org.apache.wicket.authorization.strategies.page.SimplePageAuthorizationStrategy in wicket-core installs the same pattern. A visitor who is already signed in is not affected, because no interception occurs. Request-body parameters stored alongside the intercepted URL are not applied to the resumed form: the resumption is a redirect, so the resumed request is a GET, and form components read their values from the query string on a GET.

As a workaround, refuse unauthorized access with org.apache.wicket.RestartResponseException instead, which does not store the original destination; visitors are then not returned to the page they asked for after signing in.

This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 9.1.0 through 9.24.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.11.0.

Releases before 9.1.0, which is every 8.x release and 9.0.0, are not affected, because the resource isolation this issue concerns was introduced in 9.1.0. They are not protected either. Their only cross-origin defence is org.apache.wicket.protocol.http.CsrfPreventionRequestCycleListener, which works out where a request came from by reading its Origin header and falling back to its Referer header. Neither header need arrive: a browser does not send Origin on the plain GET a link uses, and the document on the other origin decides through its own referrer policy whether a Referer reaches the application at all. That mechanism therefore never made the guarantee the Fetch Metadata based policy makes, and on those releases a listener invocation from another origin is not reliably refused in the first place. Anyone on a release before 9.1.0 who wants this protection should upgrade to 9.x or 10.x and register ResourceIsolationRequestCycleListener.

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 9.25.0 or 10.12.0, which fix the issue.

References

1 sources

Inside the record

Evidence available

Package identity
Version evidence
Remediation guidance · not supplied
Weakness classification
Additional publishers

Describes the evidence in this view, not whether the product is safe.

Original records

CVE-2026-82898

View the latest unmodified CVE JSON from the official source. It may be newer than this imported page.

cve.new JSON →

Underlying weaknesses

The source’s classification of what caused the vulnerability.

CWE-696 ↗

CWE-696 Incorrect Behavior Order

apache

Related →
Contributing organizations · 2
apache

Assigning organization

2026-11-01
CISA-ADP

Additional data publisher

2026-11-06

Timeline

All times UTC
  1. Advisory published

    Publication date supplied by the source.

  2. Source updated

    Latest modification date supplied by the source.

  3. Last imported by cve.new

    Latest catalog import, not the date we first saw this advisory.

What changed

Follow changes
  1. CVE · CVE-2026-82898

    Observed 2026-11-06T15:07:40.598Z · upstream updated 2026-11-06T14:52:29.545Z

    Prioritization updated

    before

    []

    after

    [
      {
        "source": "CISA-ADP",
        "type": "SSVC",
        "role": "CISA Coordinator",
        "timestamp": "2026-11-06T14:52:16.245165Z",
        "decisions": [
          {
            "name": "Exploitation",
            "value": "none"
          },
          {
            "name": "Automatable",
            "value": "no"
          },
          {
            "name": "Technical Impact",
            "value": "partial"
          }
        ]
      }
    ]

Large field values are marked as truncated previews. Original source snapshots remain retained.

Showing up to 50 most recent observed changes.