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CVE-2026-82389medium6.5

Bluetooth Classic HFP AG wipes an object still linked in the SDP request list on connect failure, causing a NULL dereference

Impact

The Zephyr Bluetooth stack, versions 4.4.0 and earlier, has a NULL dereference vulnerability in the Hands-Free Profile Audio Gateway role. A remote device in radio range can cause a crash or hang by advertising an invalid RFCOMM channel. The impact is limited to the Bluetooth stack.

Summarized by @cf/meta/llama-3.3-70b-instruct-fp8-fast. Verify details against the original sources.
Applies when

Reading the peer's SDP record requires no pairing, and the peer can also trigger the failure by dropping the ACL or racing an RFCOMM DLC on the same DLCI at the right moment.

Affected packages

This source has no supported package-version data for matching. You can read the advisory here, but this record alone cannot power a dependency check.

Affected products

Vendor version evidence. Product records are separate from automatic dependency matching.

zephyrproject · zephyr

zephyr

1 range

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affected

4.4.0 → before 4.5.0

semver versions

unaffected

unknown

Other versions: unaffected

Original source description

In the Bluetooth Classic Hands-Free Profile Audio Gateway role, hfp_ag_create() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/hfp_ag.c starts an SDP discovery toward the peer, which links the embedded ag->sdp_param._node into the SDP client's pending request list in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/sdp.c. If the subsequent bt_rfcomm_dlc_connect() call fails, bt_hfp_ag_connect() cleaned up by memset()-ing the entire AG object while that node was still linked, and while ag->slc_work could still be queued on the system work queue. An in-flight SDP discovery cannot be cancelled — bt_sdp_discover_cancel() is declared in the public header but has no implementation — so the request stays in the list with its func, pool and uuid pointers zeroed.

The RFCOMM channel passed to bt_hfp_ag_connect() is taken from the peer's own SDP Hands-Free service record in the normal AG flow (bt_sdp_get_proto_param() performs no range validation, and samples/bluetooth/classic/handsfree_ag feeds the value straight through), so a remote BR/EDR device in radio range that advertises an RFCOMM channel outside the valid range 0x01..0x1e deterministically forces bt_rfcomm_dlc_connect() to fail and reach the wipe. Reading the peer's SDP record requires no pairing, and the peer can also trigger the failure by dropping the ACL or racing an RFCOMM DLC on the same DLCI at the right moment.

When the SDP client next advances its request list, sdp_client_discover() dereferences the zeroed parameters — net_buf_alloc(param->pool, …) with a NULL pool and param->uuid->type — and the result-notification paths call through the NULL params->func. Zeroing a linked node also truncates the request list behind a stale tail pointer, and re-arming the freed AG slot re-appends the same node and can produce a self-looping list that hangs the Bluetooth RX thread. The impact is a crash or hang of the Bluetooth stack; the written value is a constant zero at a fixed static address, so no attacker-controlled write is available.

Only builds with CONFIG_BT_CLASSIC and CONFIG_BT_HFP_AG that use the Audio Gateway role are affected.

Inside the record

Evidence available

Package identity · not supplied
Version evidence
Remediation guidance · not supplied
Weakness classification
Additional publishers

Describes the evidence in this view, not whether the product is safe.

Original records

CVE-2026-82389

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Underlying weaknesses

The source’s classification of what caused the vulnerability.

CWE-476 ↗

memory-safety

zephyr

Related →
Contributing organizations · 2
zephyr

Assigning organization

2026-10-26
CISA-ADP

Additional data publisher

2026-10-26

What changed

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References

2 sources