Processing instruction target and content emitted unescaped in Saxy encoder allows XML injection
Severity and exploitation
KEV coverage does not rule out exploitation.
Assessment vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:NAssessment vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:NSeverity
low2.1CVSS measures technical severity, not the likelihood of an attack.
Known exploitation
Not listed in the checked CISA KEV catalog
Absence from CISA KEV does not rule out attacks.
Public exploit
Not established by this record
Missing evidence does not mean no public exploit exists.
Remediation
Package fixes recorded
Fix versions are recorded for 1 of 1 mapped packages. Check each release branch and any separate product guidance.
What this means
Saxy's XML encoder allows XML injection by emitting processing instruction targets and content unescaped, affecting versions from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0. An attacker with access to untrusted input can inject arbitrary elements, attributes, and processing instructions. The impact depends on the consumer of the XML.
Summarized by @cf/meta/llama-3.3-70b-instruct-fp8-fast. Verify details against the original sources.Attack conditions
No attack-condition excerpt has been identified here. Review the full source description and references for authentication, network access, and configuration requirements.
Review supporting sources →Affected versions
Check the exact model, release, and any platform requirements against your installation.
qcam · EEF
saxy
1 range
qcam · EEF
saxy
Package identity
pkg:hex/saxyExplore saxy →Identity supplied by EEF. Version matching requires compatible range evidence.
Compare with this publisher’s ranges. This does not inspect your installation.
affected
0.7.0 → before 1.7.0
semver versions
Other versions: unaffected
Product identifiers (CPE)
cpe:2.3:a:qcam:saxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*qcam · EEF
saxy
1 range
qcam · EEF
saxy
Package identity
pkg:github/qcam/saxyIdentity supplied by EEF. Version matching requires compatible range evidence.
Compare with this publisher’s ranges. This does not inspect your installation.
affected
7266632e9407842f28ffac254c56dc41210a5690 → before 4aeb80e2acc318f57bd7453ad2eafd59101a90e0
git versions
Other versions: unaffected
Product identifiers (CPE)
cpe:2.3:a:qcam:saxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*Packages
Compare each installed version with the publisher’s affected ranges. Where a fix is recorded, choose the appropriate release branch and test compatibility before upgrading.
| Affected range | Recorded fix |
|---|---|
| From 0.7.0 before 1.7.0Semantic versions | 1.7.0 |
Version evidence: OSV · EEF-CVE-2026-66295
View original version evidence (15 explicit versions)
Source version evidence
This source records affected versions without identifying a package ecosystem and name. This evidence is not used for package matching.
What to do
Compare your installed product and version with the affected versions above. A matching product name alone does not confirm exposure.
Use the recorded fix for your release branch. Review the publisher’s instructions and test compatibility before upgrading.
Do not place untrusted data in processing instructions. Where a dynamic value is unavoidable, validate it before building the node: reject any content containing ?>, and reject any target that does not match the XML Name production or that equals xml case-insensitively. Alternatively, carry the value in element content or an attribute instead, both of which the encoder escapes.
cve.new guidance unless attributed to a publisher. This page does not inspect your installation.
Public exploit evidence
No public exploit reference is identified in the imported evidence. This is not a claim that no exploit exists.
Original source description
Read the full publisher description
Summary
Saxy's XML encoder writes the target and the content of a processing instruction into the output document verbatim, without validation or escaping. The encoder builds the construct by concatenating both fields between <? and ?>, so neither field is checked against the constraints the XML specification places on it.
Because ?> terminates a processing instruction, a target or content value containing that sequence closes the construct at a position the attacker chooses. Everything the attacker writes after it is emitted as ordinary markup at document level, which allows arbitrary elements, attributes, and further processing instructions to be injected into the serialized document. Appending a matching <? keeps the encoder's own terminator well-formed, so the result still parses and the injection is silent rather than a visible corruption. The target is additionally unconstrained by the XML Name production, which permits injection before the remainder of the processing instruction.
The result is XML injection into a serialized document: the tree the application asks Saxy to encode and the tree a downstream parser reads back are no longer the same. Character data, attribute values, and comments are all escaped by the encoder, so processing instructions are the one construct that passes user bytes through untouched. Since Saxy.XML.processing_instruction/2 is a documented public builder, an application inherits the flaw without misusing the API. The consequences depend on what consumes the XML: forged records in a feed or export read by another system, injected stylesheet or rendering directives, or active content where the output is served to a browser as XML or SVG.
This issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0.
Workarounds
Do not place untrusted data in processing instructions. Where a dynamic value is unavoidable, validate it before building the node: reject any content containing ?>, and reject any target that does not match the XML Name production or that equals xml case-insensitively. Alternatively, carry the value in element content or an attribute instead, both of which the encoder escapes.
Configurations
The application must serialize a document containing a processing instruction whose target or content is derived from untrusted input, by passing a {:processing_instruction, name, content} node (typically built with Saxy.XML.processing_instruction/2) to Saxy.encode!/2 or Saxy.encode_to_iodata!/2. Applications that never place dynamic data in processing instructions are not affected.
References
6 sourcesInside the record
Evidence available
Describes the evidence in this view, not whether the product is safe.
Original records
CVE-2026-66295View the latest unmodified CVE JSON from the official source. It may be newer than this imported page.
cve.new JSON →Underlying weaknesses
The source’s classification of what caused the vulnerability.
Environment requirements
These conditions apply together as specified by the publisher. A matching product name alone does not establish exposure.
EEF · platform conditions
All conditions must hold
Any condition may hold
Vulnerable product
cpe:2.3:a:qcam:saxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*From (inclusive): 0.7.0
Before: 1.7.0
Applicability preview
[
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:qcam:saxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "1.7.0",
"versionStartIncluding": "0.7.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
],
"operator": "AND"
}
]Contributing organizations · 2
Assigning organization
Additional data publisher
Timeline
All times UTCAdvisory published
Publication date supplied by the source.
Source updated
Latest modification date supplied by the source.
Last imported by cve.new
Latest catalog import, not the date we first saw this advisory.
What changed
Follow changes- CVE · CVE-2026-66295
Observed 2026-11-10T17:53:00.825Z · upstream updated 2026-11-10T17:43:03.747Z
Prioritization updated
before
[]
after
[ { "source": "CISA-ADP", "type": "SSVC", "role": "CISA Coordinator", "timestamp": "2026-11-10T17:42:52.953846Z", "decisions": [ { "name": "Exploitation", "value": "none" }, { "name": "Automatable", "value": "no" }, { "name": "Technical Impact", "value": "partial" } ] } ]
Large field values are marked as truncated previews. Original source snapshots remain retained.
Showing up to 50 most recent observed changes.