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CVE-2026-62146high7.8

Cri-o: cri-o: sandbox state poisoning via pod annotations may expose runtime socket

Impact

A trust-boundary flaw in CRI-O's sandbox state persistence allows attacker-influenced pod metadata to overwrite CRI-O's own reserved sandbox bookkeeping; once reloaded as trusted after a restart, a later container recreate in that sandbox can expose a host-side runtime-management resource inside the container, enabling container escape.

Source excerpt · redhat

What to do

There is no complete workaround; until a fix is available, administrators should restrict who can create/update pods and set arbitrary annotations via RBAC/admission policy, minimize unnecessary CRI-O restarts or node reboots and monitor for anomalous container mounts (e.g. under /dev/shm) following runtime restarts, then apply the vendor patch once released.

redhat guidance

Affected packages

This source has no supported package-version data for matching. You can read the advisory here, but this record alone cannot power a dependency check.

Affected products

Vendor version evidence. Product records are separate from automatic dependency matching.

Red Hat · Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.16

Other versions: affected

Version / rangeSource status
0:1.29.13-16.rhaos4.16.git84cfdc6.el8 to before *unaffected
redhat version evidence

Original source description

A trust-boundary flaw in CRI-O's sandbox state persistence allows attacker-influenced pod metadata to overwrite CRI-O's own reserved sandbox bookkeeping; once reloaded as trusted after a restart, a later container recreate in that sandbox can expose a host-side runtime-management resource inside the container, enabling container escape.

References