Investigate in your agent.

Turn this advisory into a focused investigation. Ask your agent to check your project’s versions, explain the evidence, and suggest a compatible fix.

Your agent needs remote MCP support and access to https://cve.new/mcp.

Read the setup guide

Skip to content
cve.newCreate a CVE report
Check your stack
CVE-2026-128909

DJI AeroScope Mobile: Firmware updates are not signature-verified

Products / packages DJI AeroScope Mobile (TP703) · DJI AeroScope Mobile (TP703) 1300 communications board firmware

Published

Share

Unsupported when assigned

NCSC.ch marked the affected products as already unsupported when this CVE was assigned. A patch may not be available. Review the vendor references for migration or mitigation guidance.

This tag describes support at assignment time, not current support for every related product.

Severity and exploitation

Not in CISA KEV

KEV coverage does not rule out exploitation.

KEV checked 14/11/2026, 22:45:30 UTC
NCSC.ch · CVSS:3.1 · 8.8
Assessment vectorCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Severity

high8.8

CVSS measures technical severity, not the likelihood of an attack.

Known exploitation

Not listed in the checked CISA KEV catalog

Absence from CISA KEV does not rule out attacks.

Public exploit

Not established by this record

Missing evidence does not mean no public exploit exists.

Remediation

Source guidance available

Review the recorded instructions. Guidance may be a workaround rather than a fixed version.

What this means

DJI AeroScope Mobile firmware 03.00.00.26 and 1300 communications board firmware 02.00.07.12 through 02.00.08.40 do not verify cryptographic signatures for firmware updates, allowing an unauthenticated attacker on the local network to install modified firmware. The device must be accessible on TCP port 16000. No fixed firmware is available as the product is discontinued.

Summarized by @cf/meta/llama-3.3-70b-instruct-fp8-fast. Verify details against the original sources.

Attack conditions

Exploitation requires network access to TCP port 16000 on the board and that the unit is not connected to another controlling host. NOTE: This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer.

Excerpt from the original source description below.

Review supporting sources →

Affected versions

Check the exact model, release, and any platform requirements against your installation.

DJI · NCSC.ch

AeroScope Mobile (TP703)

1 range
NCSC.ch version evidence
Platforms: ARM

Compare with this publisher’s ranges. This does not inspect your installation.

affected

03.00.00.26

custom versions

unaffected

unknown

Other versions: unknown

DJI · NCSC.ch

AeroScope Mobile (TP703) 1300 communications board firmware

1 range
NCSC.ch version evidence
Platforms: ARM

Compare with this publisher’s ranges. This does not inspect your installation.

affected

02.00.07.12 → through 02.00.08.40

custom versions

unaffected

unknown

Other versions: unknown

Automatic dependency matching is unavailable for this record. Use the product evidence and publisher’s instructions to check your installation.

What to do

Compare your installed product and version with the affected versions above. A matching product name alone does not confirm exposure.

DJI AeroScope Mobile has been discontinued and is no longer supported by DJI. No fixed firmware is available. Operators should plan to replace affected units with a supported product and, until then, apply the workarounds.

NCSC.ch guidance ↗

Connect the unit's management Ethernet port only to an isolated network segment with no untrusted hosts, and do not route or bridge that segment to other networks, so that TCP port 16000 and the multicast discovery traffic (225.0.0.37, UDP port 16001) cannot be reached. The device has no setting that enables signature checking of firmware updates.

NCSC.ch guidance ↗

cve.new guidance unless attributed to a publisher. This page does not inspect your installation.

Public exploit evidence

No public exploit reference is identified in the imported evidence. This is not a claim that no exploit exists.

Original source description

Read the full publisher description

Improper verification of cryptographic signature (CWE-347) in the firmware update handler of the management service (uavmonitor_usbv1) of the 1300 communications board in DJI AeroScope Mobile (TP703) firmware 03.00.00.26, with 1300 communications board firmware 02.00.07.12 through 02.00.08.40, allows an unauthenticated attacker on the local network to install modified firmware, which gives persistent code execution as root. The device accepts any image that matches an MD5 checksum supplied in the same request and does not verify a signature. Exploitation requires network access to TCP port 16000 on the board and that the unit is not connected to another controlling host. Reproduced by running the unmodified device binaries in emulation; not tested on a physical device.

NOTE: This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer. DJI has discontinued AeroScope Mobile and no fixed firmware is available.

References

3 sources
cyber-defence-campus.github.io/projects/vulnerabilities/CVE-2026-128909/
Security advisoryNCSC.ch
www.dji.com/aeroscope
Source referenceNCSC.ch
llorencroma/dji-aeroscope-root · repository
Source referenceNCSC.ch

Inside the record

Evidence available

Package identity · not supplied
Version evidence
Remediation guidance
Weakness classification
Additional publishers · not supplied

Describes the evidence in this view, not whether the product is safe.

Original records

CVE-2026-128909

View the latest unmodified CVE JSON from the official source. It may be newer than this imported page.

cve.new JSON →

Underlying weaknesses

The source’s classification of what caused the vulnerability.

CWE-347 ↗

CWE-347 Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature

NCSC.ch

Related →
CWE-494 ↗

CWE-494 Download of Code Without Integrity Check

NCSC.ch

Related →
Contributing organizations · 1
NCSC.ch

Assigning organization

2026-11-13

Timeline

All times UTC

  1. Advisory published

    Publication date supplied by the source.

  2. Last imported by cve.new

    Latest catalog import, not the date we first saw this advisory.

What changed

Follow changes
No substantive changes have been recorded here yet. History starts when cve.new observes a change after tracking is enabled; earlier edits are not reconstructed.

Large field values are marked as truncated previews. Original source snapshots remain retained.