Seroval: Script injection through RegExp sources in serialized output
Impact
seroval writes a RegExp as a regular expression literal. In affected versions, the element that the serialized output is placed in, and run script in the page.
Source excerpt · OSVAffected packages
Start with the recorded fix for your release branch. Check your installed version and test compatibility before upgrading. Fixing this advisory does not rule out other vulnerabilities in the release.
| Affected range | Recorded fix |
|---|---|
| From 1.5.5 before 1.6.10Semantic versions | 1.6.10 |
| Earlier releases before 1.0.0Semantic versions | 1.0.0 |
Version evidence: OSV · GHSA-9wx9-5pv9-3349
View original version evidence (0 explicit versions)
Affected products
Vendor version evidence. Product records are separate from automatic dependency matching.
lxsmnsyc · seroval
| Version / range | Source status |
|---|---|
| < 1.0.0 | affected |
| >= 1.5.5, < 1.6.10 | affected |
Original source description
Summary
seroval writes a RegExp as a regular expression literal. In affected versions, the < character in a RegExp source is written without escaping. A source built from untrusted input can then end the HTML <script> element that the serialized output is placed in, and run script in the page.
Details
seroval escapes < in strings, so string values cannot end a <script> element. RegExp sources did not get the same escaping:
- Versions before 1.0.0 wrote the source as is.
- Version 1.5.5 stopped escaping
<inRegExpsources, so that named groups and lookbehinds keep working. This removed the escaping for every<in a source.
These functions are affected:
serialize,serializeAsynccrossSerialize,crossSerializeAsync,crossSerializeStream- the
Serializerclass compileJSON
toJSON, fromJSON, toCrossJSON and fromCrossJSON are not affected, because they never produce JavaScript.
Impact
An application is affected when all of these are true:
- It builds a
RegExpfrom untrusted input that is used as regular expression syntax. Input passed through an escaping helper (such as anescapeRegExpfunction) is not enough to exploit this. - It serializes that
RegExpwith one of the functions above. - It places the output inside an HTML
<script>element, as server rendering usually does.
In that case an attacker can run script in the page of any user who receives that output.
Patches
Fixed in 1.6.10. A RegExp whose source contains < is now written with the RegExp constructor and an escaped string source. Named groups and lookbehinds keep working.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade:
- Do not serialize a
RegExpbuilt from untrusted pattern syntax. Send its source and flags as strings, and build theRegExpon the client. - Or reject patterns that contain
<before they reach the serializer.
References
- Security advisory github.com/lxsmnsyc/seroval/security/advisories/GHSA-9wx9-5pv9-3349
- Patch github.com/lxsmnsyc/seroval/commit/f94ee0b63936dae954ff50d5b5e8ea7cb9b284e6
- Release notes github.com/lxsmnsyc/seroval/releases/tag/seroval@1.6.10
- Security advisory nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-116582
- Source reference github.com/lxsmnsyc/seroval