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CVE-2026-110952unknown

Apache Kafka: Broker does not enforce JWT issuer and audience validation for SASL/OAUTHBEARER by default

Impact

Apache Kafka brokers using SASL/OAUTHBEARER authentication do not enforce JWT issuer and audience validation by default, potentially allowing unauthorized access. This affects versions 3.1.0 to less than 4.4.0. The vulnerability can be mitigated by setting expected issuer and audience values.

Summarized by @cf/meta/llama-3.3-70b-instruct-fp8-fast. Verify details against the original sources.

Affected packages

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Affected products

Vendor version evidence. Product records are separate from automatic dependency matching.

Apache Software Foundation · apache

Apache Kafka

1 range

Package identity

pkg:maven/org.apache.kafka/kafkaExplore org.apache.kafka:kafka →

Identity supplied by apache. Version matching requires compatible range evidence.

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affected

3.1.0 → before 4.4.0

semver versions

unaffected

unknown

Other versions: unaffected

Original source description

A Kafka broker that authenticates clients with SASL/OAUTHBEARER using the bundled JWKS-backed validator always verifies the JWT signature, but two further checks are only performed when explicitly configured:

  • The issuer (iss) claim is verified only when sasl.oauthbearer.expected.issuer is set. When it is unset, a validly-signed token carrying the expected audience is accepted regardless of which issuer minted it.
  • An audience (aud) claim is required only when sasl.oauthbearer.expected.audience is set. When it is unset, a validly-signed token that omits the aud claim is accepted. (A token that carries an aud claim is still rejected when no expected audience is configured.)

Both options default to unset and have been documented as optional (Importance LOW) since KIP-768 (3.1.0).

Impact: The exposure is realizable mainly in deployments whose JWKS endpoint serves signing keys for more than one issuer (a multi-tenant identity provider, an aggregated/shared JWKS, or shared signing keys): a token minted for a different issuer, or a token lacking an audience, may be accepted to authenticate — potentially as a higher-privileged principal. In a single-issuer deployment where the provider controls the iss claim and issues audience-scoped tokens, exposure is limited. The signature trust anchor remains enforced in all cases. This is distinct from CVE-2026-33557 (acceptance of unsigned/unvalidated tokens); here the signature is validated and only the issuer/audience checks are not enforced by default.

Mitigation (all affected versions, no upgrade required): Set both sasl.oauthbearer.expected.issuer (to your provider's exact iss value) and sasl.oauthbearer.expected.audience (to the audience(s) your brokers expect), per listener. Brokers that set these perform exact-match issuer/audience checks and are not affected. Both have been available since 3.1.0.

Resolution:

  • From Apache Kafka 4.4.0: a broker configured with a JWKS endpoint fails to start unless both sasl.oauthbearer.expected.issuer and sasl.oauthbearer.expected.audience are set (secure by default). Deployments that intentionally do not restrict the issuer and/or audience may opt out per axis with sasl.oauthbearer.allow.unverified.issuer=true and/or sasl.oauthbearer.allow.unverified.audience=true.

Inside the record

Evidence available

Package identity
Version evidence
Remediation guidance · not supplied
Weakness classification
Additional publishers · not supplied

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Original records

CVE-2026-110952

View the latest unmodified CVE JSON from the official source. It may be newer than this imported page.

cve.new JSON →

Underlying weaknesses

The source’s classification of what caused the vulnerability.

CWE-345 ↗

CWE-345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity)

apache

Related →
CWE-1188 ↗

CWE-1188 Initialization of a resource with an insecure default

apache

Related →
Contributing organizations · 1
apache

Assigning organization

2026-10-28

What changed

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References

1 sources