Apache Kafka: Broker does not enforce JWT issuer and audience validation for SASL/OAUTHBEARER by default
Impact
Apache Kafka brokers using SASL/OAUTHBEARER authentication do not enforce JWT issuer and audience validation by default, potentially allowing unauthorized access. This affects versions 3.1.0 to less than 4.4.0. The vulnerability can be mitigated by setting expected issuer and audience values.
Summarized by @cf/meta/llama-3.3-70b-instruct-fp8-fast. Verify details against the original sources.Affected packages
Affected products
Vendor version evidence. Product records are separate from automatic dependency matching.
Apache Software Foundation · apache
Apache Kafka
1 range
Apache Software Foundation · apache
Apache Kafka
Package identity
pkg:maven/org.apache.kafka/kafkaExplore org.apache.kafka:kafka →Identity supplied by apache. Version matching requires compatible range evidence.
Compare with this publisher’s ranges. This does not inspect your installation.
affected
3.1.0 → before 4.4.0
semver versions
Other versions: unaffected
Original source description
A Kafka broker that authenticates clients with SASL/OAUTHBEARER using the bundled JWKS-backed validator always verifies the JWT signature, but two further checks are only performed when explicitly configured:
- The issuer (iss) claim is verified only when sasl.oauthbearer.expected.issuer is set. When it is unset, a validly-signed token carrying the expected audience is accepted regardless of which issuer minted it.
- An audience (aud) claim is required only when sasl.oauthbearer.expected.audience is set. When it is unset, a validly-signed token that omits the aud claim is accepted. (A token that carries an aud claim is still rejected when no expected audience is configured.)
Both options default to unset and have been documented as optional (Importance LOW) since KIP-768 (3.1.0).
Impact: The exposure is realizable mainly in deployments whose JWKS endpoint serves signing keys for more than one issuer (a multi-tenant identity provider, an aggregated/shared JWKS, or shared signing keys): a token minted for a different issuer, or a token lacking an audience, may be accepted to authenticate — potentially as a higher-privileged principal. In a single-issuer deployment where the provider controls the iss claim and issues audience-scoped tokens, exposure is limited. The signature trust anchor remains enforced in all cases. This is distinct from CVE-2026-33557 (acceptance of unsigned/unvalidated tokens); here the signature is validated and only the issuer/audience checks are not enforced by default.
Mitigation (all affected versions, no upgrade required): Set both sasl.oauthbearer.expected.issuer (to your provider's exact iss value) and sasl.oauthbearer.expected.audience (to the audience(s) your brokers expect), per listener. Brokers that set these perform exact-match issuer/audience checks and are not affected. Both have been available since 3.1.0.
Resolution:
- From Apache Kafka 4.4.0: a broker configured with a JWKS endpoint fails to start unless both sasl.oauthbearer.expected.issuer and sasl.oauthbearer.expected.audience are set (secure by default). Deployments that intentionally do not restrict the issuer and/or audience may opt out per axis with sasl.oauthbearer.allow.unverified.issuer=true and/or sasl.oauthbearer.allow.unverified.audience=true.
Inside the record
Evidence available
Describes the evidence in this view, not whether the product is safe.
Original records
CVE-2026-110952View the latest unmodified CVE JSON from the official source. It may be newer than this imported page.
cve.new JSON →Contributing organizations · 1
Assigning organization
What changed
Follow changesLarge field values are marked as truncated previews. Original source snapshots remain retained.